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Summary  findings
Development economics has made remuarkable  progress  Simpler, because much technology is uncomplicated, and
in 50 years, says Waelbroeck, summarizing changes in  complex because even simple technology requires
the field since Nehru's first proposals for an indepetident  ingenuity and a costly investment in adaptations.
India. Synthesizing insiglhts  about changes in the field  *  There has been a radical change in economists' view
from the many contributors to the Handbook of  of marker agents and policymakers. Gone are the days
Development Economi-cs,  Waelbroeck observes (among  when economists thought their advice should be aimed
other things):  mainly at planners. Policymakers are utility maximizers,
* Different schools of thought may dominate, but the  too. Employees of state enterprises coalesce into
range of research has broadened.  Econo.mics  has  powerful interest groups that block efforts to raise
"hardened" as its practitioners have learned to use data  productivity. The new thinking is sometimes modified by
more carefully and to reason more rigorously.  evoking the vague concept of "governance," under which
* The policy message has been turned upside down.  the economist's task is to help design a system of
Gone is the idea that development is industrialization  interacting state and private institutions that, led by the
and that the main policy problem is to manage the  state, cooperate in achieving social goals. Whether
interface between country and city. Today urbanization  something useful will come from this line of thinkilng
and industrialization are viewed as mere components  of  remains to be seen.
an integrated transformation,  in which the expansion of  Waelbroeck detects major gaps in economists'
foreign trade is central. Traditional  institutions are  understanding of development, suggesting a particular
viewed with far more understanding, because overhasty  need for further  study of collective action (a far more
modernization has often proved counterproductive.  pervasive component of human action than is realized)
- More than ever, development is seen as a "whole  and the selection of roles by individuals and the costly
replacement" process, the key to which is mastery of  investment this entails (a concept that may shed light on
Northern  technology - now understood  to be both  Schumpeter's well-known but little-studied
simpler and more complex than previously thought.  entrepreneur).
This paper is a product of the Research Advisory Staff. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818
H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contactJane  Sweeney, room MC4-394, telephone 202-473-1021,  fax 202-
522-0304, Internet address jsweeney@worldbank.org. May 1998. (49 pages)
"The quarrel about export-oriented  strategies is
over among politicians-a  worldwide
consensus recognizes their superiority and the
list is short of the countries whose leaders still
believe in import substitution. It will last forever
in the  quarrelsome  academic  world  ... And  the
academic debate should continue, because why
outward orientedness appears to be so effective
is a mystery."
The Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disseminates  the findings  of work in progress  to enzcourage  the exchange  of ideas  about
development  issues.  An objective  of the series  is  to get the  findings  out quickly,  even i/ the presentations  are  less  than  fully  polished.  IThe
papers carry the names of the authors and should he cited accordingly. The findings,  interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this
paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily  represent the view of the Wloild Ba2k, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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Based  on the Handbook  of Development  Economics
Jean  Waelbroeck'
I Universite  Libre  de Bruxelles  and ECARE.Half a Century of Development Economics, a Review




2) Structuring the Presentation:  Policy Consensuses and Academic Paradigms
3) The Indian Cong]ress  Consensus
4) The Dual Economy Development Paradigm
5) Neo-Radical Ideas, an Aborted...  or a Dormant Paradigm?
5.1) Dependency Theory and Exploitation
5.2) Latin American Structuralism
5.3) Streeten on the Embryo of a Possible World State
5.4) An Aborted Paradigm?
6) Questioning the Dual Development Paradigm
6.1) Does a Large Labor Market Failure Exist?
6.2) That World Markets Cannot Accommodate Southern Exports is Wrong;
the "Four Dragons Consensus"
7) Half a Century of Historical Experience and Data
7.1) Experiments by Nature
7.2) "Stylized Facts" of Development and the Fashion for Cross-Country Regressions
7.3) Survey-Based Studies Data and the New Micro Econometrics
7.4) The Emergence of Today's Homo Economicus
7.5) Modelling General Equilibrium
8) Development Economics and the Rational Agent Paradigm
9) Growth Accounting as a Cumulation of Entrepreneurial Gains
9.1) Population and Labor Force Growth
9.2) Rural-Urban Migration and the Job Opportunities of Migrants
9.3) The Supply of Human Capital and Its Use
9.4) Private Saving and Its Intermediation
9.5) Foreign Capital and Its Intermediation
9.6) Technological Progress and Its Implementation
210) The Outward-Oriented Policies Controversy
11) Structural Adjustment and the One World Consensus
11.1) The Evolution of Policy Making in the South
11.2) A "Washington Consensus" -- or a "One World" Consensus
12) Income Distribution Policies in the One World Consensus
13) Tying Up Loose Ends
13.1) "Releasing...  the Latent Talent and Creativity of the Common Man,"
Capabilities and Functionings
13.2) "Being for Myself, Who Am I?" Collective Action
13.3) "A Million Mutinies" and Structural Adjustment




India  will celebrate  the fiftieth anniversary  of its independence  this year, an event  that marked
the beginning  of the process  which  dismantled  colonial  empires  that included  half of the world's
population.  The development  of the newly independent  countries  has  evoked  a vast economic
literature,  which  the three  volumes  of the Handbook  of Development  Economics  present.
The contributions  are thorough  and the variety  of views in this area of economics  is fairly
represented.  A clear account  is presented  of the views of the Latin  American  structuralist
school  and of what Evans  calls the "Marxians" 2, which involve  concepts  and approaches  that
are unfamiliar  to mainstream  economists.  The three  thousand  pages  are a hefty read,  but
provide  an unmatched  perspective  on half a century  of development  research.
There is balance  also  with respect  to the other  great  divide  of the discipline,  with authors  who
are involved  in policy making  producing  papers  of the sort that decision  makers  find worth
reading,  whereas  those  whose  main outlets  are scientific  journals  tend to write the prudent
prose  that gets papers  past persnickety  referees.
Development  economics  has undergone  profound  changes  in a half century,  but reading  the
Handbook  reveals  that many  questions  remain  open. I have  tried to be particularly  sensitive  to
remarks  that suggest  that important  problems  are not being  addressed,  and present  in the last
section personal  remnarks  on such  issues.
The paper is organized  as follows.  Following  a discussion  of the diverse  strands  of the early
development  literatLire  and of the policies  implemented  after independence,  the paper
discusses  how historical  experience  and the evolution  of the dominant  paradigm  of economic
research  have  transformed  our understanding  of the development  process.  Along the way,
issues  that are not  well understood  are noted,  setting  the stage  for a final section  where, using
a conceptualization  of development  proposed  by Sen,  tentative  suggestions  are made that
may provide  answers  to the unsolved  problems.
2) Structuring  the Presentation:  Policy  Consensuses  and Academic  Paradigms
Development  economics  is a very applied  science,  which policy  makers  and academics  have
enriched.  Politicians  emphasize  their differences  but tend to think alike  to a surprising  extent.
Why that is so coulcl  be the subject  of an interesting  article  but some  of the reason  must be
frequent  contacts,  the influence  of the media,  and each individual's  keeping  close  watch on the
success  of policy innovations  elsewhere.  These  "consensuses",  as I shall refer  to them, do not
exist at all times but when  they do, it is usually  possible  to characterize  by one name the set of
interlocked  hopes  and principles  that inspired  them. Rebuilding  a "new  and better Europe"  was
fundamental  to the officials  who met in the OECD  after the war to implement  the Marshall  Plan,
2 2:24:1242,  meaning  chapter  24 in volume  2 of the Handbook,  page  1242.  This style  of reference  will be used
throughout  the paper.  Volumes  1 and  2 were published  in 1989,  volume  3 six  years  later in 1995.  The  chapter
number  is omitted  when  what is cited  is the comment  of a Handbook  editor.
The term 'Marxian" has the  merit  of being  less  politically  loaded  than  "Marxist".
4for example,  as the concept  of a "Single  Market"  (including  currency  unification)  has inspired
European  Union  governments  in recent  years.
Academics  disagree  about everything  and it sometimes  seems  that each significant  article
induces  one that disproves  it. There  is an anchor  in this swirling  and it is the agreement,  so
strong  that it borders  on intolerance,  of an overwhelming  majority  of academics  about what
Kuhn [1962]  has called  a "paradigm",  a shared  view about  assumptions,  the discipline's
frontiers, and the topics  that merit  attention.
3) The Indian  Congress  Consensus
In the Handbook,  Srinivasan 3 calls attention  to the marvelous  pages  that Nehru  devoted  to
economic  planning  while in jail in Ahmadnagar  in 1944  and 1945.  They set out the conclusions
of a large  group of businessmen,  trade  unionists,  and officials  of provincial  governments  whom
he had brought  together,  who worked  for two years  on a plan  that could serve  as a model  for
Indian planning  after independence.  What is striking  is the consensus  reached 4 about
economic  policies.  What I shall call the "Indian  Congress  consensus"  defined  the program  of
government  that Nehru  later implemented;  these policies  seemed  so obviously  right at the time
that the leaders  of other newly  independent  developing  countries,  many  of whom must have
had no chance  to study Nehru's  book,  made  them into  cornerstones  of their policies.
These  pages make  amazing  reading  as most of the ideas of early development  economics  are
there, laid out in 14 pages  with  the clarity  and brevity  of an extraordinary  mind;  truly, as
Srinivasan  points out, those pages  marked  the beginning  of development  economics.  In what
follows, I rephrase  Nehru's  ideas  in modern  terms, replacing  references  to India by general
references  to developing  countries.
Over a century  and a half,  standards  of living  in the developed  world -- "the North"  had shot  far
ahead  of those in "the South"  -- developing  countries.  Yet -- hadn't  Asia represented  for so
long the advancing  spirit of man  -- men  everywhere  were of equal  ability.
The European  miracle  had been  the industrial  revolution  and industrialization  would be the key
to development.  The South  must acquire  the technology  which had made  the miracle  possible.
Southern  countries  needed  to modernize  their societies.  Traditional  modes  of thought and
institutions  should  be beaten  back  and the mass  of the people  given an education.
Industrialization  could  take place  fast. It had taken a century  and a half to create Northern
technology  but now the South  could  acquire  a technology  that was far superior  to that which
propelled  the beginnings  of the industrial  revolution.
Agriculture  would require  attention  because  it is so large  and what it produces  is so necessary.
It is in agriculture  that the most abject poverty  is to be found.  Overcoming  poverty,  indeed,
3 3:2468;  also  see Srinivasan  (1996).
4 Nehru  (1989)  Apart  from representatives  of big  business,  to Nehru's  obvious  irritation.
5would be a fundamental  task.  This could not be achieved  without  rapid growth,  but much  could
be accomplished  by eliminating  exploitative  institutions.
A choice of society  was unavoidable.  To the leaders  of independence  movements,  who had
experienced  the selflessness  of the struggle  against  imperialism,  it was clear that the society
that they would  build  should  rest on collective  action rather  than on the spirit of acquisitiveness
of capitalist  society.  B3ig  business  was suspect.  Production  by individuals  could not be efficient,
but state enterprises  and co-operatives  could  attain  the scale required  by modern  industry.
And who but the state could  lead the great  transformation?  Planning  would  organize  a massive
collective  effort;  through  the planning  process  men  from all walks of society  would iron out their
differences  and coordinate  the industrialization  process.  This was no dream as the success  of
the USSR  demonstrated.  An underdeveloped  country,  through  a succession  of five-year plans,
it had made itself  strong  enough  to resist  the might  of Nazi Germany.  Unlike  the Soviet  Union,
India  would be a democracy.
Nehru  was as negative  with respect  to international  trade as to big business.  He connected  it
with imperialism  and the domination  of countries  by economically  more  powerful  ones.  We
must not forget as we read him how the pursuit  of trading  interests  drove  the colonization  of
India,  and how prominent  when he  wrote  were Germany's  demand  for Lebensraum  and
Japan's initial  efforts  to create  its Asian Co-Prosperity  Scheme.
Autarky  was the ideal  solution.  Trade  was useful  only as a "vent  for surplus"  to use the term
coined  by Adam  Smith. New heavy industries  would  produce  the equipment  that
industrialization  required.  Nehru  was unaware,  it is clear,  of the success  of the very different
Japanese  development  models,  led by the powerful  Zaibatsus  in close cooperation  with a
multitude  of small enterprises,  thanks  to which  Japan  had inflicted  serious  defeats  on the
combined  forces of the British  Commonwealth,  the Dutch  Empire,  and the United  States while
fighting a major  war in China  -- a model  that helped  to inspire  what I shall call the Four
Dragons  consensus,  which  modified  so profoundly  our understanding  of development.
Other notable  points are
--  Welfare is viewed in basic needs terms.
--  Agricultural labor has a zero marginal product.
--  The state must control  the "commanding  heights"  of the economy.  To prevent business
from grasping  its own commanding  heights,  strict controls  were established  after
independence  on the largest  20 financial  groups  in the country.
Nehru provides  a fascinating  account  of his debate  with Gandhi,  who feared that the emphasis
on high technology  and heavy  industries  would lead  to widespread  unemployment.  Gandhi's
intuition  was right;  clearly  he started  the debate  about  appropriate  technologies,  and it is an
intriguing  thought  that had he lived, and given a stubbornness  of purpose  and flexibility  of
6thinking  that Nehru underlines,  he could have inspired  a far more  effective  economic  policy
than  the one Nehru  chose 5.
Finally,  the history  of India might  have been  quite different  had Nehru  realized  how deep
rooted were the difficulties  which plagued  his experiment.  He should  have understood  that the
procrastination  and inconclusive  debates  which marred  an exercise  in paper planning  would
render  unmanageable  an elaborate  planning  process,  played  out at the scale of a sub-
continent,  involving  real jobs and real money,  and determining  the careers  of the civil servants
involved.  Here also Nehru's  solution  of insulating  planners  from the political  process
anticipates  later  thinking  on development.
4) The Dual Economy  Development  Paradigm
It is time to turn to the academic  debate  on development  which Nehru  anticipated  so brilliantly.
The "whole  economy  replacement"  concept  was its hub, i.e.,  the idea  that through a complex
process  which involved  returns  to scale,  externalities,  and many  other mechanisms,
development  would replace  by modern  systems  economies  that had been based  on traditional
technologies.  From  a human  point  of view,  the most visible  transformation  would  be a shift
from a situation  where most of the population  lived in rural areas  to one where most lived in the
cities,  hence  the interest  in "dual  economy"  models  that emphasized  this aspect  of the
development  process.
Gustav  Ranis's  presentation  in chapter  4 of the Lewis-Fei-Ranis  dual economy  model  of
development  deserves  pride  of place in this connection. 6 He  does not present  a true model but
an accounting  scheme,,  complemented  by a verbal  discussion  of the mechanisms  that move
the system.  This describes  the labor,  commodity  and financial  flows between  industry  and
agriculture.  Ranis  insists  that his  "agriculture"  stands  for the subsistence  sector  which is not
subject to market  forces. In the subsistence  economy,  wages are not set according  to the
marginal  principle  but to sharing  principles  rooted in long established  customs.  They exceed
the marginal  product  of labor  (Ranis'  article  does not retain  the assumption  that agricultural
labor has a zero marginal  product).  Such  an economy  is characterized  by a large  slack (a
market  failure he could  have said);  by eliminating  this, industrialization  has a powerful  impact
on economic  growth.
Trade is discussed  only in a brief  section  on policy  in an open economy  where part of the labor
force has been "weaned  away"  from agriculture  during  the colonial  period,  earning  foreign
exchange  that served in part to pay  for consumer  goods  imports.  This provides  scope for an
"easy import  substitution"  phase  of development  where capital  goods imports  take the place  of
formerly  imported  consumer  goods, replaced  by domestically  produced  ones.  The few
countries  that lack natural  resources  may resort  to "export  substitution"  by exporting  the same
consumer  goods. Ranis  lauds  Adam  Smith's  concept  of trade as a vent for surplus  according
to which, in the mode  of garage  sales,  countries  earn foreign  exchange  by disposing  of goods
5 The contribution of small enterprises, many of which were created by farmers, to Japanese, Korean, and
Taiwanese development is well known; even more relevant in Ghandi's perspective have been China's
township and village enterprises, taking origin in Mao's communes, which have demonstrated how traditions
of rural cooperation can beget modern activities which create much employment and wealth.
6 Also see Fei and Ranis (1974).
7for which they have no use. That this concept  which  Smith put  forward only because  he had
not thought his  way to the principle  of comparative  advantage,  is praised  by many  of the "not
for trade" authors  in the Handbook  illustrates  their lack  of appreciation  of trade's  contribution  to
development.
The Lewis-Fei-Ranis  model  proposed  overcoming  a gigantic  market  failure by forced
industrialization.  In truth two failures  are involved,  the "slack"  described  by the author,  and
another  very large  one implied  by the optimal  tariff problem  because  export  demand  is so
inelastic  that import  substitution  is the only reliable  way to secure  foreign  exchange  for
industrialization.
The Bruno-Chenery  two gaps model  made the situation  explicit. Paying  for the capital  goods
required  by industrialization  requires  saving  as well as foreign  exchange.  Their analysis  of this
limitation  on growth  is discussed  in several  chapters  of the Handbook.
Chapters  29 an 32 by Stephen  Lewis,  and by Dwight  Perkins  and Moshe  Syrquin,  discuss
issues that were important  in the initial  paradigm.  The early writers  thought  of developing
countries  largely  as exporters  of commodities.  Stephen  Lewis  presents  case  studies of such
countries.  Large  countries  attracted  attention  in the early literature  in connection  with the
debate  about balanced  growth.  Perkins  and Syrquin  discuss  their problems,  using  the patterns
of development  analysis  to which Syrquin  has made notable  contributions.  They examine  inter
alia whether  large countries  grow differently  from others;  finding  that they have a larger  share
of heavy industries  (typically  characterized  by scale economies)  and grow faster than  smaller
ones. It would  be interesting  to examine  whether  the second  finding  is a reflection  of the fact
that many  small countries  are in low-growth  Sub-Saharan  Africa. It would  have been useful  to
show that the markets  for manufactures  in "large  countries"  like India  and Brazil  are actually
quite small,  contradicting  the widespread  belief of their citizens  that those  countries  can pursue
autarkic  growth at little cost in efficiency.
Peter  Timmer's  chapter  8 complements  the chapter  by Ranis  by presenting  the contributions  of
other early writers.  Johnston  and Mellor's  (1961)  alternative  dual economy  model highlights  the
importance  of nutrition  because  of its presumed  impact  on labor  productivity;  this also could
cause "market  failure."  Timmer  presents  several  important  ideas,  including  Nurkse's  argument
(1953)  that crop rotation,  by boosting  agricultural  output,  made  the industrial  revolution
possible,  prefiguring  Irma Adelman's  concept  of Agricultural  Development  Led Industrialization
(ADLI);  Hoselitz's  (1953)  and Bairoch's  (1975)  pessimistic  prediction  that development  would
fail because  population  in the South  grew  too fast and not enough  land was available  to feed
the large cities  which characterize  advanced  economies;  and finally  the challenging  data used
by Hayami  and Ruttan  to show  that technical  progress  in agriculture  is land-saving  in Europe
and Japan and labor-saving  in North  America,  and thus responds  to factor scarcities.
Going much  further back,  W. Arthur Lewis's  chapter  2 complements  those  chapters  by
discussing  the contribution  of five 18th  century  British  authors  to the theory  of economic
development,  the last of whom is Adam  Smith. Beside  better known  achievements,  those
authors provided  lucid  statements  of the concepts  of the agricultural  surplus, human  capital,
entrepreneurship  as a separate  factor of development,  and continual  unemployment.  Progress,
Lewis  notes briefly,  continued  in the first half of the 19th  century  after which  "interest  in
development  theory  would  almost  die out until the theoretical  explosion  of the 1950s  and after,"
an curiously  Anglo-Saxon  centric  note  that disregards  the fundamental  contributions  of Marx,
8List, Heckscher,  and Schumpeter,  not to forget those  of the economic  historian  Henri Pirenne
and the sociologist  Max Weber,  that are part of the intellectual  baggage  of our profession.
5) Neo-Radical  Ideas, an Aborted... or a Dormant  Paradigm?
The chapters  discussed  in this section  present  the ideas  of Handbook  authors  whom for
shortness'  sake it is convenient  to lump  together  as "neo-radicals",  who share a common
distrust  of neoclassical  economics.  The chapters'  authors  have sympathy  for that school, but
do not all belong  to it.
5.1) Dependency  Theory  and Exploitation
Chapters  3 and 24 by Pranab  Bardhan  and David  Evans  discuss  "dependency  models"  that
describe  how anonymous  economic  forces stifle  the efforts  of countries  to escape  from the trap
of underdevelopment.  The best known  is the Prebisch  Singer  model,  which claims that
differences  in income  elasticities  of demand  for primary  products  and industrial  goods,
combined  with the struggle  for higher  wages  by organized  workers in the North,  have the effect
that the benefits  of Southern  productivity  growth  accrue  to the North.  The weak empirical  (and
in the case  of the Prebisch  Singer model  also logical)  foundations  of those models  are noted.
Lewis's  elegant  neoclassical  model  of trade 7 between  England  and tropical  countries  analyzes
rigorously  a situation  where market  forces bring  about such  a transfer, but its relevance  is
limited  to the fairly rare situations  where  the South  produces  cocoa and similar  commodities
that have no equivalent  in the North.  This excludes  peanuts  for example,  which compete  with
soybeans  as sources  of vegetable  oils, or natural  rubber  which competes  with synthetic
rubber.  A model  by Taylor  and Bacha  (1976)8  describes  a situation  where rich  groups in the
population  have a high marginal  propensity  to consume  luxuries  which  they produce,
engendering  feedbacks  that widen  inequalities;  the authors note  that the assumption  about
propensities  is contradicted  by the empirical  findings  of Clark  (1975).
Exploitation  often entails  manipulation  of the legal  framework  in favor of ruling  groups. Here
David Evans  draws attention  to the relevant  use by Roemer 9 of the concept  of the core of a
game as an useful  way of characterizing  how the prohibition  of specific  contracts  may induce
exploitation.  Nehru  complains  repeatedly  in the work  cited about incidents  where the British
forbade  or discouraged  Indian  industrial  projects  to protect  their industry  -- from a theoretical
standpoint,  this amounts  to narrowing  the set of sub-coalitions  that Indian  agents may form and
changing  the "core  of the game"  in favor of British  players.
In a similar  spirit but using a quite different  device,  both Lester  Taylor  and Persio  Arida's
chapter  6 and Evans  use the concept  of closure  to represent  how the use of political  power
enables  a social group  to modify  the working  of mechanisms 10. Closure  is best known  as a
7 Lewis  (1969),  see  Evans  2:24:1258  and  ff.
8 See  1:6:167,  Taylor  and  Bacha  (1976).
9 Evans  2:24:1266  provides  a variety  of  references  to Roemer's  work.
10 C.f. Taylor's  discussion  (1  :6:189)  of  the different  ways in which,  because  available  policy  instruments  were  not
the same,  Malthus  (1798)  and Preobrazhensky  (1924)  analyzed  differently  the problem  of feeding  the cities in 19th
century  capitalist  England  and in the Soviet  socialist  state.
9technical  device  that keeps models  manageable 1".  It can however  also,  the authors  suggest,
express  the ability of a social group  to disable  an economic  mechanism  to achieve  its goals.
"Maintained  hypotheses  about  the direction  of causality",  they conclude,  "are  the key to the
results  of most models  described  herein...  one causal  structure  may be more  appropriate  than
another. However,  the decision  is almost  always  external  to the models."
5.2) Latin  American  Structuralism
Latin  American  structuralism  does not fit neatly  into the paper's  system of paradigms  and
consensuses.  Its inspiration  is as universal  as the expression  of the hostility  of non-economists
to the realities  of economic  management,  and in particular  to the conditionality  imposed  by the
International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF)  and World Bank  to countries  in difficulties.  The arguments
come up everywhere.  "The problems  are structural,  investment  cannot be cut back it is needed
to break boftlenecks".  "High real wages  sustain  demand".  "Devaluation  reduces  purchasing
power  and is thus deflationary".  "High  interest  rates  raise costs they are inflationary".
Such arguments  are incomplete  rather  than  wrong, as they take account  only of the parts of
economic  mechanisms  which confirm  what  the common  man  wishes  were true, and neglect  or
assume away the others.  They have led to grave errors,  and it is not so long ago that the
Prime  Minister  of a large  developing  country,  with an  American  Ph.D.,  reduced  interest  rates  to
combat inflation 1 2 and that the governor  of the Russian  Central  Bank  did not believe  that
printing  money  raises prices.  Only in Latin  America  did something  like a school  develop  in
universities  and in the Economic  Commission  for Latin  America,  which  sought  to legitimize  this
thinking.
That literature  is splintered  into a multitude  of small macroeconomic  models,  each of which
captures  a few econonnic  mechanisms.  The reader  is helped  by Sherman  Robinson's  and
Christopher  Bliss's  presentations  of this system  of thought  in chapters  18 and 23, but reading
the defense  of this school of thought in Taylor  and Arida's  chapters  is the best way to grasp the
main ideas 1 3. Some  points  are valid, especially  with respect  to the disastrous  losses  that
economic  stabilization  inflicts  on banking  systems  when inflation  ends; it has proved  only too
true that opening  up Latin  American  economies  to the market  would  be slow and painful.
These  structuralist  models  have no solid  empirical  grounding,  unfortunately,  and are not based
on a coherent  view of the motivations  of agents;  they are quite mechanical  and Taylor and
Arida themselves  acknowledge  that "summarizing  these contributions...  is not possible
because  so many "effects"  are involved" 4."
5.3) Streeten  on the Embryo  of a Possible  World  State
In a thoughtful  piece,  Streeten  describes  the current  world economic  order and provides  a
subtle albeit  contorted  defense  of a defunct  component  of the world  agenda,  the New
International  Economic  Order  (NIEO).  This refers  to the hope  that arose after the fairly short
11 See the discussion  below  of applied  general  equilibrium  modelling.
12 Taking  seriously  apparently  the so-called  "Cavallo  -Wright  Patnam  effect",  devised  independently  by a Latin
American  structuralist  and  an obscure  Texas  Congressman.
13 See also Chenery  (1975).
14 2:27:863.
10lived triumph of OPEC  that developing  countries  would be able  to enforce  a reform  of the world
economic  order similar  to that which  trade unions  forced  employers  to accept  in the 19th
century,  and takes on board  the fact that the attempt  failed. He legitimizes  retrospectively  the
Southern  demands  for "special  and differential  treatment",  as an expression  of (possibly  quite
complicated)  "universal  principles".
The embryo  of the world super  state that he sketches  seems  unrealistic  at first reading,  but
reflection  suggests  that his proposal  makes  sense as the long-term  goal  that he intends  it to
be. The presentation  is marred  by the error  that, begotten  from constant  warfare,  the European
nation  state achieved  a definitive  triumph at the Peace  of Westphalia,  which  destroyed  the
Holy Roman Empire.  That empire  operated  quite successfully  until the first world war without
becoming  a nation  state,  as an Austrian  Empire  that was far more respectful  of nationalities
and cultural  differences  than nation  states have been; it was obviously  far more  successful
than  the nation states  that were created  to replace  it. And after a (historically)  brief interregnum
the European  Union  (EU)  was born,  which resurrected  its decentralized  model  of political
organization.  It is an intriguing  thought  that the EU, probably  one of the most successful
political  innovations  of this century,  will, after  the Euro  is created,  embody  every one of the
functions  which Streeten  proposes  to entrust  to his world  government;  is it unimaginable  that
his world state might  come into  being  some  day through  the cooperation  and later  the merger
of a variety of EU-type  regional  organizations' 5?
5.4) An Aborted  Paradigm?
A World EU could come  into being.  Dependency  theory is dead because  it was based  on an
erroneous  view of the world. Developing  countries  are not sufficiently  different  from developed
ones to justify its generalizations.  Latin  American  structuralism  tackled problems  that were real
and important. It was flawed in its insistence  that the problems  of Latin America  could be
solved  by quick fixes, without  the pain  that, unfortunately,  is necessary  to eliminate  the
legacies  of decades  of poor economic  management.
What the neo-radicals  call for consistently  in their Handbook  chapters  is an economics  that is
more  concerned  with social ideals  than  the work  which  today's  dominant  paradigm  inspires.
The Handbook  is sensitive  to those  concerns. They are for example  the chief  focus of the
chapters  by Binswanger  et al and Maler and Dasgupta,  while Sen's  chapter  stresses  the value
systems  that underlie  our views on economic  justice. The neo-radicals  are also critical  of the
adequacy  of today's dominant  theoretical  paradigm,  which  they feel cannot deal  with important
issues.  The "tying up loose  ends"  section  of the paper  will return  to this.
6) Questioning  the Dual  Development  Paradigm
6.1) Does a Large Labor  Market  Failure  Exist?
In 1980,  lan Little  and I were chatting  and the conversation  drifted  to that favorite  of academic
small talk, the latest Nobel  award.  "An obvious  one I should  think," said Ian; "clearly,  Lewis  got
15 In  the developing  world,  India's  constitution  is as a remarkable  illustration  of the benefits  of decentralization,  as it
enabled  a variety  of peoples  to preserve  their  cultures  while co-habiting  in peace.
11it for stating  that the marginal  product  of agricultural  labor  is zero, and Schulz  for showing  that
it is not."
That was a quip, but a deep  one. The initial  model  of development  was flawed,  and so was
Nehru's  and other leaders'  understanding  of the functioning  of their countries.  Those  errors
had serious  consequences.  The welfare  of the developing  world would be much  higher  today
had they been avoided.
Schulz initiated  the questioning  of one pillar  of the early work, that the large  subsistence  sector
of agriculture  does not respond  to market  forces in the way prescribed  by microeconomic
theory, because  of patterns  of solidarity  that have  their roots in an age old experience  of
poverty  and famines.  A proper  subsistence  sector  exists almost  nowhere  unfortunately,  as
confirmed  by the estimate  cited  by Rosenzweig  (1:15:758)  that approximately  30 percent  of
income  of farm families  is of nonagricultural  origin;  there is a large nonagricultural  labor market
in rural areas. Published  in 1964,  Schulz's  findings  were accepted  after some years  by the
academic  community,  but decades  had to pass  before policy  makers  in developing  countries
began  to take seriously  the idea that successions  of poor crops  are more often  the result of
inadequate  prices  than of persistent  drought.
6.2) That World Markets  Cannot  Accommodate  Southern  Exports  is Wrong;
the "Four Dragons  Consensus"
Little,  as he made his quip, could  have added  that together  with Scitovsky  and Scott 16 -- and
Balassa  -- he had initiated  the questioning  of the second  error  that marred  the early work, that
the access  of developing  countries  to world  markets  is limited.  Again, with  the benefit  of
hindsight,  we can see  what a strange  idea it was. A basic principle  of development  economics
is that men  everywhere  have similar  abilities.  No  deep knowledge  of industry  is required  to
know that, as Pack  remarks  in the Handbook,  the technology  used in many industries  is simple
and easy to acquire  7. What inferiority  of developing  peoples  could prevent  them from
producing  goods  that satisfy  consumers  in the North?  The same  appetite  for a profitable
bargain,  which induces  a peasant  woman  in Senegal  to walk kilometers  to exchange  fruit for a
towel if the prices  she has been  told about are right,  will convince  a French  housewife  to buy a
cheap electric  iron, produced  at low cost in Mauritius.  Why did it take decades  to convince
development  economists  and policy  makers  in the South  of such  a reasonable  truth?
In this instance  the lqobel  prize,  if one is awarded,  should  go to the policy makers  who took a
chance  on trade, instead  of rewarding  the academic  economists  who took note  of their
success.  There  is debate  about  why the governments  of Korea  and Taiwan,  which invented
outward-oriented  growth,  set out on a course  that forty years later  a large  majority  of
developing  countries  are trying  to emulate.  On Taiwan  and Korea I trust Vogel, who is
mercifully  uninterested  in the controversy,  masters  several  East Asian languages,  and has
devoted  a life of study  to that region.  He has  it that Japanese  ideas had a strong effect  on
thinking  in Korean  and Taiwanese  business  circles,  where  many  in the elites spoke Japanese
16 Little,  Scitovsky,  and  Scott (1970),  and Balassa  (1971).
17 See Pak  (1:9:340).  Deng,  born  a peasant  and who  worked  in a factory  both  as a young  man  in France  and
during  the cultural  revolution,  must  have  understood  both  that agricultural  prices  matter,  and  that little magic
is involved  in many  areas  of industrial  technology.
12fluently  and had been  able to observe  at first hand  why Japan had developed  so successfully 18.
The influence  of US  economists  on government  thinking  was strong  in Taiwan, a good deal
less so in Korea.  For Hong  Kong,  observers  agree  that the colony  chose the one course open
to it. No one has been  privy  to Lee Kwan-yu's  inner  thoughts  but from hearsay 19 he decided,
after listening  patiently  to the advice  of Northern  development  economists,  that the strategy of
planning  and import  substitution  which  they proposed  was wrong, and set his  country  on its
very successful  course.  Whatever  the motivations,  the developing  world can be grateful  that
four governments  initiated  a policy  pattern  that would  over  the years revolutionize  policy
making  throughout  the South.
7) Half a Century  of Historical  Experience  and Data
It is data that has  driven  the progress  of development  economics,  data and the
imaginativeness  of economists  who realized  that accepted  theory  was empirically  wrong.
Appropriately,  the Handbook  devotes  significant  space  to the factual  knowledge  that has
accumulated  over  a half  century  of development.
The space  constraint  makes  it impossible  to detail  those chapters.  Empirical  facts have had
such a great impact  on development  economics  that they will sneak  their  way back over  and
over again into  the argument.
7.1) Experiments  by Nature
As the founders  of modern  econometrics  at the Cowles  Commission  emphasized,  true
experiments  are so hard to arrange  that economists  have  to rely  on "nature"  to design  the
experiments  that verify our theories.  We have  just seen an example  of this truth in our
discussion  of the policy innovation  of the Four Dragons'  leaders.  The results  of those  "natural
experiments"  are the only data  that policy  makers  pay heed  to.
Hence  the importance  of the excellent  Handbook  chapters  40 and 44 by Anne Krueger  on
policy  lessons  from post war experience,  and by Corbo  and Fischer  on structural  adjustment.
7.2) "Stylized  Facts"  of Development  and the Fashion  for Cross-Country  Regressions
Development  economics  is indebted  to the economists  who, using  patience  and simple  tools,
built up and analyzed  the quantitative  record  of development.  An excellent  chapter 7 by Moshe
Syrquin  reminds  us of the insights  that we owe to Kuznets  and to Chenery  in this area of
research,  and to the purchasing  power  data  set up by Kravis,  Summers,  and Heston  and later
by Summers  and Heston;  as well as to Paul Bairoch's  work  on the historical  role of agriculture
and trade, Angus Madison's  work on the historical  record  of growth,  Goldsmith's  work on
financial data; and many  other contributions.  Development  economics  started  out with the fact
that development  implies  industrialization;  much  of the rest we owe to those men.
18 For example  Vogel  (1991),  pp 48-9.
19 The source  is Helen Hughes,  who has extensive  and  long standing  contacts  in that island.
13The latter have no responsibility  for the veritable  industry  that has  sprung  to life as diskettes
spread  through  the world data  that had been put together  by patient  marriages  of snippets  of
data  with uncertain  guesses.  Cross-country  regression  results  must be viewed  critically.  As
Syrquin  notes  (1  :7:ZZO),  they are reduced-form  estimates  of far more complicated  models  and
do not provide  reliable  evidence  on causality.  Two approaches  have been used,  which are
both  dubious.  Quick  and dirty single  regressions  have  been widely  used,  but their results  are
subject to overwhelming  "missing  variables"  biases;  complex  specifications  would be more
trustworthy  but they are sensitive  to the choice  of proxies  and dummies  that take account of
hard-to-measure  effects.  Such regressions  may  point to interesting  mechanisms  but to
produce  reliable  conclusions,  they should  be complemented  by deeper  study at the country
level and validated  by a credible  theory.
It is crucial  to be aware of the extremely  poor quality  of much  of this data. Angus Deaton's
chapter  33, which draws on a survey  edited  by Srinivasan 20, discusses  evidence  on this score.
Summers  and Hestorn  themselves  assign  a score  of D+ to D to data  for 66 out of 138 countries
(Srinivasan  3:2493).  Given  the tendency  of newspapermen  to view development  as a GNP
race, it is good  that the Handbook  calls attention  the large influence  on growth  rates on the
quite arbitrary  estimates  of official  statisticians  on the size and growth rates  of the informal
sector, and about the lack  of reliability  of data  for the African  countries,  which account  for so
many  of the data points in cross-country  regressions 21. John Strauss  and Duncan  Thomas
make  a similar point in chapter  34.
7.3) Survey-Based  Studies  Data  and the New Micro Econometrics
The doubts  that are warranted  with respect  to the macroeconomic  data lend importance  to the
information  provided  by sample  surveys.  Here  development  economists  owe a debt to the
initiatives  of the great  Indian  statistical  school,  to which we also owe important  theoretical
insights.  Both Deaton  and Strauss  and Thomas  discuss  the figures  collected  by such surveys
as the very early  Additional  Rural  Incomes  Surveys,  as well as the intensive  ICRISAT  surveys
of the International  Crops  Institute  for Semi  Arid Tropics,  carried  out by investigators  who live
in the sample  villages,  and of the very useful  data  generated  by the World Bank's  Living
Standards  surveys,  which cover  for an increasing  number  of countries  a broad  array  of
variables in addition  to the standard  budget  data.  The Handbook  authors  stress that there is no
reason  to question  the quality  of the sample  data,  whose accuracy  matches  that for developed
countries.  Such  surveys  are still few in number  unfortunately,  and have all too often been
stopped  after a few years;  expansion  of this work is desirable.
This development  has been  complemented  by significant  progress  in "micro  econometric"
methods  which both  Deaton's  and Strauss  and Thomas's  chapters  describe.  New statistical
techniques  have evolved,  and valuable  experience  has accumulated  about how to control
selection  and other  types of bias.  Thanks  to this work  we are now much  better  informed  about
such important  topics  as the impacts  of education  on productivity,  and of investment  in hospital
facilities  on health.
20 Srinivasan  (1994);  on the China/India  growth  race;  see  Timberg  (1997),  which  comments  on a volume  comparing  the
two countries,  edited  by Srinivasan  (1993).
21 The recent  Boskin  report  (1996),  co-authored  by  economists  with a high reputation,  which  suggests  that US national
accounts  data has underestimated  by 1.3 percent  the rate  of growth  of consumption,  shows  that GDP  growth  rates
are subject  to doubt even  in countries  whose  statistical  system  is highly developed.
147.4) The Emergence  of Today's  Homo Economicus
Finally,  in Paul Krugman's  words 22, "The theory  has become  more  exciting, more  dynamic  and
much  closer  to the world view long held by insightful  observers  who were skeptical  of the old
conventional  wisdom."  A backward  look at our  discipline  provides  perspective  on why
development  economics  has changed  so much  over half a century.
A Homo Sapiens,  the author  of these lines  is the product  of four million  years of natural
selection.  Homo Economicus  has  evolved  at a far more  dizzying  speed. The
Macroeconomicus  and Microeconomicus  varieties  were so different  after the war that many
thought  them to be distinct  subspecies.  Many  differences  remain  in spite of limited inter-
breeding.  This rapid evolution  will surely continue,  as the paradigm  that guides  our work
reflects  economists'  efforts  to understand  the real world.
Keynes'  consumer  was a simple beast,  not so different  from a worm inching  its way on a sandy
sea bottom,  gulping  sand into one end of which it spews  out a lesser  quantity  at the other, the
difference  being  the organic  matter  that it digests 23. The discussion  of investment  in the
General  Theory  reflects  a subtle Cambridge  understanding  of capital  theory but this leads  to
little  and what readers  retained  was  that investors  are driven  by animal  spirits. John Bull could
stand many  things but not a 2 percent  interest  rate,  thus the liquidity  preference  schedule  did
not intersect  the X axis.
In standard  microeconomic  theory, consumers  were alone  in a world which  transmitted  price
signals.  So little  was deduced  from the assumption  of utility  maximization 24 that many
professors  "started  from demand".  The theory  of monopolistic  competition  examined  how
businessmen  matched  marginal  cost and marginal  revenue,  concepts  that no one has  found a
way to quantify  from accounting  and market  data.
Price  theory  was so far removed  from the real world  that many  came  to accept  that prices did
not matter,  a conviction  that was buffered  by surveys  by Oxford  Keynesians  that purported  to
show that interest  rates  does not influence  the investment  decisions  of businessmen,  and
regressions  which  showed  that the price elasticity  of demand  for exports  is so low that the
Marshall  Lerner  equilibrium  condition  does not hold. The skepticism  about prices accounts  for
the popularity  at that time of Harrod-Domar  and input-output  models,  that dispensed  with
prices in their description  of economic  mechanisms.
Micro economists  were so fascinated  by the implications  of market  failures  stemming  from
scale economies,  externalities  and the second  best character  of equilibria  that their students
could well think  that Adam Smith's  invisible  hand  works so poorly  that their chief  task, should
they become  policy makers,  would  be to correct  its working.
22 Krugman  (1995),  p 360  in Handbook  of Economic  Innovation  and Technical  Change,  ed., Stoneman,  Oxford:
Blackwell  pp 342-36.
23 The Phillips  machine  that is on show  in London's  Albert and  Victoria  Museum,  that was used  in teaching  at the time.
illustrates  the model's  simple  plumbing.
24 The  Giffen  paradox;  and  the Slutzky  conditions.
15What I am describing  is of course  the rock bottom  knowledge  that professors  want students  to
walk away from university  with; Coase's  article on the nature  of the firm was a decade  and a
half old already,  but to understand  Krugman's  remark,  think of today's rock bottom  concepts;  in
macroeconomics,  rational  expectations  and their implications  for speculation  and for the
credibility  of government  policies;  in microeconomics,  moral  hazard  and adverse  selection,  the
importance  of transactions  in designing  institutions  and a grasp of the Nash equilibrium
concept,  to cite important  ideas.
And what the future civil servant  is taught, finally,  is not to play God  to correct market
imperfections,  but be wary of the skill with which,  via lobbies  or by capturing  regulators,  market
agents deflect  to their advantage  the most cunningly  designed  interventions.  Stiglitz  sums up
the new point of view as he closes his Handbook  chapter.  "Information  problems  may give rise
to public  (governmental)  failures  and lead  to market  failures.  The analysis  of the appropriate
role of government  is far more  complex  than  traditional  analyzes  lead us to believe.  But if we
have learned  this simple  lesson,  we have learned  a lot."
7.5) Modeling  General  Equilibrium
Contrary  to a belief  that was widespread  among  economists,  solving  applied  general
equilibrium  (AGE)  models  has not proved  particularly  difficult,  and a lively sub-discipline  has
sprung up to exploit  this fact, which has made  contributions  to policy  making  and academic
research.  Both Robinson  and Gunning  and Keyzer  evaluate  this.
In an informative  chapter,  Gunning  and Keyzer  describe  the current  frontier of this type of
research,  outlining  the wide range  of theoretical  and practical  problems  to which  the approach
has been  applied.  They pay  special  attention  to computational  issues,  an area to which Keyzer
has contributed.  The emphasis  is on theoretical  issues,  rather  than on the policy implications  of
the varied models  that have been  built 25.
Like all quantitative  approaches,  Applied  General  Equilibrium  modeling  has limitations.  The
chief ones are  the problem  of "closure"  first noted by Sen (1963),  and the difficulties  in
modeling  disequilibrium.  These reflect  the inability  of today's  theory  to describe  crucial aspects
of the real world.
Standard  general  equilibrium  theory  describes  an economy  which is endowed  with a complete
set of markets.  The price and demand  of milk  are observable  and it is possible  to study how
they interact.  In practice,  however,  futures  and options  markets  are at best embryonic.  Saving
and investment  decisions  depend  on agents'  perception  of future prices  that cannot  be
observed,  conditioned  on the realization  of future states  of the world of which there does not
even exist a list. Intertemporally  consistent  dynamic  models  have been solved,  which assume
that the future is certain  and that-expgctations  are rational,  but such models  are so hard to
solve that they have  to be kept very smalO 6, while  the effort is of doubtful  usefulness  since the
future is uncertain  and agents are incapable  of performing  the sophisticated  computations  that
the model's logic  implies.
25 Their implications  for trade policy  are discussed  below.
26 What  must be small  is the number  of "state  variables"  (here  capital  assets),  that are  carried  over  from one period  to
the next.
1  6Modelers  are forced  to resort  to closure  for this reason,  a frequent assumption  being  that
saving  depends on current  variables  only,  the balance  of payments  surplus or deficit  is
exogenous,  and investment  adapts  to the supply  of saving.  This is wrong of course, but useful
conclusions  may be derived  if the limitations  due to closure  are borne in mind.  Robinson's
chapter provides  useful comments  on the way in which closure  influences  model  properties.
Barro  and Grossman 27 proposed  to use  the theory of general  equilibrium  with rationing  to deal
with the phenomenon  of disequilibrium,  and a variety  of models  have been built along  the lines
which they suggested;  Edwards  and van  Wijnbergen's  chapter uses  the approach  in its
theoretical  study of adjustment  to price and real shocks.  The approach  came  into discredit
when its first inventor  renounced  it with some  publicity.
8) Development  Economics  and the Rational  Agent Paradigm
Joseph  Stiglitz's  pivotal  chapter  5 demonstrates  the fundamental  change  in conclusions  that
the application  of modern  microeconomics  to development  problems  implies.  Stiglitz  uses
contract  theory,  which  takes into account  explicitly  the asymmetric  distribution  of information
between  agents.  This views market  participants  as "contract  taking" rather  than as "price
taking"  agents.
He assumes  that agents  (or families)  are individually  rational.  He also uses  the neoclassical
rule of using  the competition  hypothesis  as a convenient  starting  point,  to be abandoned  only
when  the conclusions  are not consistent  with stylized  facts.
Building  on two efficiency  wage models,  of which  one is a generalized  version of the familiar
Harris-Todaro  (1970)  story according  to which  the risk of unemployment  accounts  for the
difference  between  urban  and rural wages,  Stiglitz  uses  an efficiency  model  to show that
nothing  is gained by transferring  workers  from country  to city. Note  that this does not invalidate
the Ranis model,  where the crucial  "slack"  arises in the countryside,  from a gap between  rural
earnings  and the marginal  product  of rural labor.  Stiglitz  analyzes  in a similar  way a nutrition
based  efficiency  model, based  on the idea  that improving  nutrition  increases  productivity.  The
models  have a methodological  rather  than a practical  interest,  since empirical  research  has
overturned  early beliefs  on the working  of urban  labor markets  and on the influence  6f wages
on nutrition.
Stiglitz's  analysis  also questions  the belief  that the interlinking  of rural  transactions,  of which
sharecropping  is the classic  example,  reflects  the existence  of exploitation.  By providing  a way
to deal  with moral hazard  and adverse  selection,  routing  transactions  through  a single
intermediary  enables  both buyers  and sellers  to adapt optimally  to the asymmetric  distribution
of information.  Eliminating  zamindars  and talukdars  from rural areas,  as suggested  by Nehru,
could be counter productive.  Since  equilibrium  of interlinked  markets  is not Pareto  optimal,
market  failure  exists that could  justify intervention;  planners  do not however  have the
information  required  to eliminate  it.
27 Barro  and Grossman  (1971  ); also see Malinvaud's  (1977)  succinct  and persuasive  summary  of the approach.
17An informal  section  discusses  the incentives  that stimulate  the considerable  saving  that
development  requires.  The main point is that the transaction  cost of the "trading  over  time" that
saving involves  is huge if the state, having  seized  control  of banks  as "commanding  heights"  of
the economy,  resorts  to inflation  to collect  an inflation  tax.
Stiglitz  then sets his sights  on the belief  of such  authors as Rostow  (1965)  that achieving  a
"take-off' investment  ratio is crucial  for development.  If capital  scarcity  was the main cause of
low productivity  in developing  countries,  back-of-the-envelope  calculations,  based  on what we
know  of production  functions,  show  that the return  on capital  l~hhe South  should  be a large
multiple  of what is obseived.  Using  Arrow's  suggestion  that education  selects  ability  as well as
it enhances  the effectiveness  of workers,  he remarks  that the standard  estimates  of the
productivity  of human  capital  are biased  so that education  cannot  generate  the large  output
increases  that development  requires.  Stiglitz  does pip the dice by assuming  a low 0.2 capital
exponent,  and over-emphasizes  somewhat  the bias implied  by Arrow's (1973)  selection  effect.
Krugman's  reputation  has  given a high  visibility  to results  by Young 28 that contradict  Stiglitz's
conclusion.  According  to that author,  all the growth  of the Dragons  is accounted  for by a
colossal  accumulation  of production  factors.  The result  is generated  by simplistic  cross-country
regression  estimates  of the type that was criticized  above,  and not surprisingly,  closer study
suggests  that they are dubious.  The 0.45  elasticity  of output  with respect  to capital  that Young
estimates  is too high. The  technical  progress  coefficient  is negative.  Egypt, Pakistan,  and
Botswana  lead the total factor productivity  league  (tourists,  dams,  and diamonds?),  Singapore
ranks  fourth from last. The absurd  results  are interesting  only in showing  that the calculations
that produced  them make  little  sense 29.
Stigliz's  point is basically  valid. To account  for the mystery,  he invokes  the immense  shadow  of
Schumpeter,  where  the entrepreneur  is the deus ex machina  of development.  The Austrian
economist  views development  in terms of the accumulation  of "net gain" investments  by
entrepreneurs,  which yield returns  that may exceed  costs by a wide margin.
9) Growth  Accounting  as a Cumulation  of Entrepreneurial  Gains
Businesses  and countries  grow by securing  control over  resources  through capital  and labor  market
transactions  or by generating  them, and using  them effectively.  There are enormous  differences  in
country  performance.  The Dragons  have caught  up in four decades  with levels  of productivity  that
the North  attained  over a century  and a half of progress,  which itself had no precedent  in human
history.  Average per  capita income  in the South  has grown  more  slowly than in the North  since
independence;  in much  of Africa it is declining  steadily.
Denison's  work on growth accounting  is well known 30. It is based  on a production  function;  the
sources  of growth are the components  of the total derivative  of a production  function  with respect  to
its arguments,  the production  factors.  Assuming  competition,  market  prices  reveal  the function's
28 Young (1994),  cited in a paper  by Krugman  (1994)  which  has attracted  much  attention.
29 Young is aware  that he has not estimated  a causal  equation  and should  know  that the conclusions  he draws  are
unwarranted,  as he remaks  that rising  productivity  both  causes  and is caused  by investment.
30 See  in particular  Denison  ,(1967).
18derivatives;  the unaccounted  for output  increase,  the "Solow  residual",  is ascribed  to technical
progress.
That residual  is apt to be large and varies a great  deal between  countries.  Strangely,  technical
"progress"  was negative  in  the USA  over  a period  of several  decades,  Americans  would  seem  to
have been  forgetting  what  they knew.  It was very high in Japan  during  the country's  very rapid
growth.  Thus, the gist of Stiglitz's  criticism  of Rostow  is that like a firm, a country's  growth involves
more  than piling up production  factors.
As Nehru  and the early development  economists  emphasized,  growth  is a "whole  economy
replacement"  phenomenon,  which  transforms  a backward  economy  into one that exploits  the
technological  knowledge  that has  accumulated  since  the industrial  revolution;  observation  suggests
that the end of this technological  transition  brings  to an end very rapid  growth -- in Germany  at the
end of the "miracle",  in the USSR  in the 1960s  (at the productivity  levels  achievable  by socialist
economies),  in Japan  roughly  a decade  ago and now deceleration  has begun  in the Dragons.  Why
the catch-up  process  proceeded  swiftly  in a few countries  only is poorly  understood  -- and fiercely
debated  between  Handbook  authors  in terms of their pro-market  or pro-state  convictions.  For the
moment,  it is enough  to note  that the production  function  approach  and the growth  theory  which is
based on it -- including,  as Bardhan  notes,  the new fangled  "endogenous  growth theory"  -- do not
clarify  the mystery.
Schumpeter's  theory  (1954)  is profoundly  different.  The  Austrian  economist  was impressed  by
enormous  differences  in business  performance,  which he accounted  for through his concept  of
innovations.  Development  results  from an accumulation  of net gain investments,  each of which
yields more  than its cost, hence  using resources  well is as important  as accumulating  them. In that
Schumpeterian  spirit,  we shall attribute  as much  importance  in this section  to the intermediation  that
steers  factors to their final use as to the ability  of economies  to accumulate  them.
9.1) Population  and Labor  Force  Growth
What should  the population  be -- the number  of consumers  and indirectly,  of workers -- is discussed
in Birdsall's,  and Dasgupta  and Maler's  chapters.  Birdsall  recalls  the initially  widespread  agreement
that a high birthrate  reduces  the rate of growth  of per capita income,  and the revisionist  literature
that questioned  this belief.  The touchstone  of her  judgment  is that the personal  choices  of
individuals  are the correct  guide  of policy  decisions  unless  they are distorted  by market  failure;
families  are viewed  as single  decision  units,  there is no  discussion  of possible  disagreements
between  man and wife (the "gender  question")  or between  parents  and descendants.
Under  those assumptions  there is no market  failure if property  rights  are correctly  defined;  for
example  the division  of a farmer's land  between  few or many  children  does not affect  his neighbors.
"Curse  of the commons"  problems  arise when  those rights  are not well defined,  e.g. grazing  rights  in
the Sahel. Pecuniary  externalities  are a possible  source of market  failure,  such as when rapid
population  growth reduces  wage rates. Decision  making  may be complicated  also by the fact that
the population  size may  be smaller  or larger  than  the optimum;  historians  such as Pirenne  or North
and Thomas  for example  considered  that the increase  in population  during  the Middle  Ages, by
reducing  transaction  costs,  was a significant  cause of Europe's  economic  development.
Government  policy  matters.  The diffusion  of information  about  birth control  techniques  -- and
through  schooling  -- lowers  the birthrate.  The strong  incentives  used in China  and Singapore
19influence  more powerfully  the birthrate  especially  in the cities,  but violate  the principle  of free choice
that welfare  economists  value.
Birdsall  should  have stated  more  explicitly  the assumptions  that support  the revisionist  view.
Srinivasan 3' corrects  this by stating  explicitly  that the revisionist  view assumes  that parents,  when
they decide  how many  children  to have,  should  take into  account  the welfare  of all members  of the
household  and of their progeny  in the indefinite  future. Surely  this assumption  is dubious.
It is more reasonable  to take into account  the biological  asymmetry  that parents  procreate  children
and not vice versa. Dasgupta  and Maler base  on this observation  an interesting  explanation  of the
demographic  transition.  In economies  where  accumulable  assets are rare in rural settings,  having
children  is the most reliable  way of providing  for old age,  thanks  to strong  traditions  which impel
them to honor  and provide  for their parents  in old age. Children,  the authors suggest,  are actually  a
source of net profit 32.
Development  loosens  this bond  by offering  children  an Hirschmanian  "exit"  by migrating  to the cities.
At the same  time (the authors  do not mention  this), a broader  set of low-risk  saving  assets  becomes
available,  unless  of course  runaway  inflation  wipes out quasi-monetary  assets.  This lowers  the
attractiveness  of child bearing.  Taking into  account  inter-generation  issues provides  interesting
insight  into  the factors that cause  demographic  transition.
9.2 Rural-Urban  Migration  and the Job Opportunities  of Migrants
The dominant  view in the early literature,  which remains  very influential  at the policy level, is
that rural-urban  migration  must be tightly  controlled.  Two questions  arise.
--  Does  a market  failure  exist  which  justifies  state intervention  to promote  industry  and
hence urban  growth,  because  the marginal  productivity  of rural labor is zero or lower
than the rural wage rate, as claimed  by Ranis  (1:4:1981)?
=-  Is the flow exogenously  generated  by the pressure  of an excessive  rural population  and,
in the absence  of careful  control,  would  coalesce  into  jobless masses  that cause
rampant  crime  and urban  unrest 33?
Mark Rosenzweig's  and Jeffrey  Williamson's  chapters  11 and 15 take a benign  view of this
migration.
Williamson,  who has  studied  British  experience  during  the 19th  century,  finds that this has
been much more  similar  to developing  world urbanization  than is generally  realized.  The rural-
urban  wage gap and the age and sex distribution  of migrants  have been broadly  similar. It is
not true that, as for example  Bairoch  has claimed,  city populations  have been sustained  by too
few industrial  jobs. The role of remittances  in boosting  rural incomes  is stressed.  The well
31 1:470;  this is only  one of the required  assumptions.
32 Boys  at any rate; girls  are a blessing  or a curse  according  to whether  they have  to be bought,  as in Africa,  or married
off with a dowry  as in South  Asia.
33 C.f.  the oft-quoted  statement,  the origin  of which  I have  not discovered,  that 100.000.000  surplus  Chinese  farmers
threaten  the country's  stability.
20known  Harris Todaro  model, predicated  on the belief  that the decision  to move  involves  a
gamble  where  winners  secure high paying  jobs in the unionized  formal  sector and losers
remain  unemployed,  is not supported  by the data: migrants  secure premium  jobs rarely but do
find work.  Williamson  finally, an author of the first general  equilibrium  model  of a rural-urban
economy,  provides  an application  of this methodology.
Rosenzweig  also finds  that theories  that assume  rural labor market  failure are not borne out by
the facts; although  identifying  distortions  remains  important  from a policy point of view, the
early teachings  of development  economists  were wrong or overemphasized.
Both confirm  that even after allowing  for the influence  of such  characteristics  as age or
education,  urban  wages  exceed  rural ones by 30 to 40 percent:  migration  is GNP increasing.
In welfare  terms,  the gain is smaller  or possibly  zero, as leaving  one's  village entails  significant
psychological  transaction  costs in terms of sundered  friendships  and family life, while it costs
more to live in a city than in the country.
Migration  is an investment  decision,  accounting  for the fact that most migrants  are young
adults,  who have time to amortize  the costs of migration.  More  longitudinal  "personal  history"
data could provide  useful  information  on the connection  between  migration  and family
decisions.
9.3) The Supply  of Human  Capital  and Its Use
Research  on education  and health  has also been progressing  rapidly,  and after devoting  two
chapters  to those topics  in volume 1, the Handbook  editors  judged that seven  years later,  there
was room  for a chapter  on the same  topics by Strauss  and Thomas  in volume  3. Along lines
pioneered  by Gary Becker,  this integrates  health  and education  into  an unified  examination  of
human behavior;  the paper  is also notable  for its exemplary  application  of recent  micro
econometric  methodology.
Both education  and health  (including  the contribution  of nutrition)  enhance  the productivity  of
workers;  and  just as migration  entails  immaterial  costs that are not reflected  in GNP,  education
and health  are the source  of benefits  that are not expressible  in money  terms,  as noted
forcefully  by Sen in the opening  chapter  of the Handbook,  as he emphasizes  that they are not
even close correlates  of material  welfare.
This is an appropriate  place  to recall  Nehru's  emphasis  on the immense  reservoir  of under-
used abilities  that is available.  Some  education  systems  may be more  efficient  than others in
"intermediating"  between  school  and work. China's  system  of national  examination  comes  to
mind in this connection 34, which sets a tradition  of meritocracy  which has influenced  all of East
Asia; in China,  this tradition  has  for millennia  moderated  the influence  of family  and political
patronage  on official  appointments,  improved  the assignment  of able individuals  to responsible
jobs, and fostered  a sense of personal  worth  among  officials,  which  enhanced  the
effectiveness  of the civil service.
34 The  selection  can be performed  either  nationally,  as in China,  or by elite  universities  such as the universities  of Tokyo
and Kyoto  in Japan,  Seoul  in Korea,  Djakarta  in Indonesia  (or by both  mechanisms).
21A role of education  that is hardly  discussed  is the externality  stemming  from its contribution  to
nation  building.  That "La R6publique"  is rooted in its education  system  goes without saying  for
a Frenchman.  Mao  and Deng  were born a few hundred  miles apart  in Southern  China, but
could communicate  only in Mandarin,  a foreign language  for them; in India,  public  education
must have contributed  to weakening  the caste system.
Finally, no one appears  to have noted  that the relative  price  of human  capital  is far lower in
poor than in wealthy  countries,  because  it is produced  by nontraded  services  whose price
depends  on the local  wage rate. It pays  for poor countries  and regions  to invest  in human
capital rather  than in machines,  as Kerala's  admired  government  seems  to have understood.
The finding  of chapters 13  and 14 survive  Strauss  and Thomas'  more  sophisticated
econometric  approach,  including  the confirmation  that parental  education  facilitates  that of
children  -- a snowball  effect  where one generation's  education  facilitates  that of the next. An
intriguing  result  is that the cost of providing  education  has been  falling,  perhaps  because
competent  teachers are  found more easily  as populations  becomes  better  educated  -- another
snowball  effect.  The progress  achieved  by post colonial  governments  in education  and health
has been  extraordinary.
The widespread  belief  that higher  incomes  improve  productivity  via nutrition  is confirmed
weakly at best: even at quite low income  levels,  additional  income  buys more  tasty food rather
than more  wholesorne  food. Finally,  nutrition  does not influence  fertility.
9.4) Private  Saving  and Its Intermediation
Chapters  10 and 16 by Mark  Gersovitz  and Clive Bell discuss  private  saving  and rural credit
respectively.  After setting  out the microeconomic  theory  of saving, Gersovitz  discusses  in
general  terms features  that are specific  to developing  countries,  such as the possible  role of
remittances  as a means  of generating  saving  and of children  in supporting  their parents  in old
age. There is an useful  discussion  of the weakness  of data.
Bell,  like Gersovitz,  judges  that research  has not advanced  to the stage  where  firm
recommendations  can be made.  He emphasizes  the logic of interlinked  credit contracts,  of
which the main components  are operational  loans  extended  by merchants  and loans by
landlords.  Bell is skeptical  about  the effectiveness  of government  attempts  to improve  farmers'
access  to credit  by creating  rural banks.
Published  seven  years later,  Timothy  Besley  provides  a powerful  analysis  which, as the
underlying  microeconomic  theory  implies,  integrates  the analysis  of saving,  credit, and
insurance  of farmers  and poor urban  workers  into  a coherent  whole.  The approach  is trade
theoretic  and the author  emphasizes  the benefits  from trading  over time and across  states of
nature.
A fascinating  finding by Townsend  (1994),  also cited by Strauss  and Thomas,  highlights  the
informal  system  of insurance  which operates  within  villages  in parts of India,  so effective  that
the consumption  of individuals  depends  more  strongly  on village  output  than on their own.  This
points to the effectiveness  of informal  insurance  arrangements.  Though  the remark  is not made
in the Handbook,  this paper  brings  development  economics  back  to square  one, as the finding
validates  belatedly  Ranis's  (and Lewis's)  much  criticized  assumption  that the income  of
22migrants  in their  village of origin may  exceed  by a significant  margin  their marginal  productivity,
so that industrialization  eliminates  a "large  slack"  between  rural incomes  and the marginal
product  of rural labor.  The only difference  is in words;  the early writers  accounted  for the slack
in terms of moral economy  concerns,  whereas  in the modern  phraseology,  it is reinterpreted  as
an adverse  selection  bias of individuals  who find it more  attractive  to draw benefits  from the
informal  insurance  scheme  in their  village  than to look for work in a distant  city. Of course,
such is the subtlety  of economic  organization  theory  that alternative  interpretations  of given
empirical  facts may imply different  policy  recommendations.
An interesting  discussion  evaluates  Basu's  suggestion  that the informal  credit  market is
uncompetitive  and offers monopolistic  landlords  opportunities  to skim the cream  from
investment  projects  through  discriminating  pricing;  we return  to this in the paper's  final "loose
ends"  section.
Formal  saving  institutions  are weak in developing  countries.  The author provides  a careful
discussion,  which complements  Gersovitz's,  of devices  which involve  risk spreading  over crops
or over locations,  and traditions  that obligate  relatives  and neighbors  to support  persons  in
difficulty.  The chapter  provides  an useful  survey  of such institutions  as Bangladesh's  Grameen
Bank,  which extends  small credits  backed  by group solidarity,  and the Raiffeisenkassen  that
evolved  in Germany  during  the last century,  which succeeded  in mediating  credit across  space
as commercial  banks  do, while using  information  on creditors  that is available  only locally.
The discussion  of domestic  saving  and of its intermediation  does not cover  urban credit  in any
detail, thus it is not possible  to implement  fully this paper's  intention  of assessing  both  the
sources  of factors and the intermediation  that channels  them  to productive  uses. It would be
interesting  to learn more  about,  for example  the impact  on investment  and on the funding  of
firms of the hyper inflation  and sweeping  bank crashes  that have plagued  some  developing
countries.
It would  have been  worthwhile  to bring  at greater length  the problem  of pensions,  which has
come  to the foreground  as the apparent  success  of the Chilean  pensions  scheme has come  to
the attention  of economists.  Throughout  the South,  the effect of development  in weakening
family  ties and in reducing  the birthrate  is undermining  traditions  that motivated  humans  to
support  their parents.  Individuals  will either have  to save  for old age,  or rely on the state to
provide  pensions  (most probably  according  to some redistribution  scheme).  The implications
for domestic  saving  are huge. In Chile,  domestic  saving  went up from 6 percent  to 26 percent
of GDP, in part  thanks  to the introduction  of an individual  pension  scheme  that is run on
accumulation  lines 35. The history  of pension  schemes  is ghastly  in Latin  America,  as states
have repeatedly  grabbed  assets  and blocked  indexation  but the Chilean  scheme's  apparent
success  has led to imitations.  In China,  the "one  child family"  policy  must be a reason  for the
country's  huge saving  rate, as individuals  provide  for their own old age.  The Indian  state of
Kerala  has decided  to create  a pension  system  for older  agricultural  workers,  to be funded by a
redistribution  scheme  apparently  (so that it will not boost  saving);  this is likely  to be imitated  by
other  states,  and a powerful  lobby  will fight to improve  whatever  initial  benefits  are granted  and
create  over  the years a large  budget  burden,  while probably  reducing  the birthrate  (already
low).
35 Morande (forthcoming in the World Bank Research Observer, cited in a NBER conference report (I suppose you have
the proper reference).
23Capital  markets  in the South  remain  fragmented  and very imperfect.  Besley  discusses
Gershenkron's  conjecture  (1962)  about the relation  between  economic  development  and the
development  of financial  intermediaries,  which  is supported  by data assembled  by Goldsmith
(1969),  who has discovered  that the ratio  of the value of financial  instruments  to wealth rises
during economic  development.  This evolution,  which had been  held back as governments
seized control  of the "commanding  heights  of the economy",  should  unfold rapidly  now that
capital markets  are being  liberalized.
9.5) Foreign  Capital  and Its Intermediation
Chapters  by Eaton,  Cardoso,  and Dornbusch  and Helleiner  discuss North-South  capital  flows
and review  their history.  Jimenez's  and Krueger's  chapters  examine  how effectively  planners
allocate  foreign  capital  and domestic  saving  to profitable  investment  opportunities.
Eaton  provides  a cogent overview  of the relevant  theory. Reading  him, one cannot avoid
pondering  the fact that the North-South  flow of private  investment  remains  very low in view of
factor scarcities  in the two parts  of the world. The stock of Northern  funds in the South  is not
insignificant,  it is true, and Cardoso  and Dornbusch 36 note that it amounted  to 30 percent  of US
GNP in 1987;  only 15 percent  was foreign  investment  however.  Expanding  this stock could
accelerate  development.  Even  today 37, world capital  flows are much  smaller  in proportion  to
GNP than before  the first  World War.  An upsurge  followed  the first oil shock,  but this ended  in
disaster  in Latin  America  and in countries  such as Morocco,  which borrowed  to postpone
adjustment,  but countries  that managed  their affairs recovered  rather  fast from the 1982  debt
shock.
The gradual  vanishing  of the foreign  exchange  constraint  that the two gaps model highlighted
has improved  the South's  ability  to absorb  foreign  capital. In 1962,  the year of publication  of
Chenery  and Bruno's  seminal  article,  Cairncross 38 already  wondered  whether  it is appropriate
to view a shortage  of foreign  exchange  as a limiting  factor in development,  as distinct  from a
shortage  of production  factors.  One of the important  changes  in the first half century  of
development  has been  -- with hiccups  such  as the current  one -- the gradual  softening  of this
constraint.  Exports  of manufactures  have opened  up markets  that were more expandable  than
those  for primary  commodities.  After  the first oil shock,  developing  countries  began  to borrow
from private  sources;  because  of poor  economic  management,  this ended  in disaster  for some,
but Asian countries  went through  the debt shock  with little  damage.  And now (thanks  to
generous  balance  of payments  support  that was quickly  reimbursed),  Latin America  has gone
through  the second  Mexican  crisis  with little  lasting  damage.  Tropical  African  countries  and
some others  are still of course in a foreign  exchange  straight  jacket, but most of the South  are
gradually  becoming  able to deal  with macroeconomic  shocks  as Northern  countries  do. This
reduces  the risk of investing  in the developing  world, and should  expand  the North-South  flow
of capital.  The process  must be gradual,  because  of complex  problems  of custody  and
investment  protection  against  fraud and seizure  that remain  to be solved, not to mention
corruption.
36 1:26:1388.
37 Taylor  (1997).
38 Chenery  and Bruno  (1962)  and Cairncross  (1962),  cited by Srinivasan  (2:1143).
24Gerald Helleiner's  chapter  27 discusses  the role of multinationals,  which  have accounted  for a
large  share of foreign private  investment  into  developing  countries.  He highlights  high
transaction  costs stemming  from protracted  and ultimately  futile haggling  over  transfer prices,
and efforts by developing  countries  to "unpackage"  such choice  tidbits as high  technology
know-how  from the investment,  countered  by the efforts  of multinationals  to avoid commitment
of their own money  to the target  country  because  this would  weaken  their bargaining  position
should  their partner  try to modify  the original  contract  by threatening  to make  the investment
unviable.  This guerrilla  war has been  interspersed  with truces as one or the other  party made
promises  that it often  did not keep;  a climate  of constant  disputes  has been more effective  in
generating  bribes  than in promoting  development.  Hopefully,  the climate  will improve.
The largely  theoretical  chapter  by Squire  discusses  the project  appraisal  methodology  which
should  guide public  funds  to the most  fruitful uses; 24 out of 27 countries  that were surveyed
by the World Bank  questionnaire  had an office  or offices  charged  with the evaluation  of
projects,  but Little  and Mirrlees 39, cited  in Jimenez's  chapter,  are probably  right in stating  that
the sophisticated  project  evaluation  method  which  they, Squire,  and others  have developed  is
little used;  Jimenez  acknowledges  this as he concludes  that "agencies  such  as the World  Bank
should  make  every  effort  to encourage  developing  countries  to discount  future net benefits  and
to use border  prices  for tradables 40."
Rodrik  and Jimenez 41 cite Kaufmann's  re-estimate  of rates of returns  from 1,200  World Bank
projects  in 58 countries,  which show  that those returns  are correlated  with indicators  of the
quality  of macro  management.  Whether  the relation  is causal  is discussed  below.
Anne Krueger  highlights  in chapter  40 the extremely  poor record  of investment  in public  enterprises,
which have accounted  for a large  fraction  of capital  investments  in many  countries.  Citing  Bardhan,
she mentions  that "In India,  for example,  62.1 percent  of total "productive"  capital and 26.7 percent
of total labor in industry  was in the public  sector by 1978-79.  Yet those enterprises  accounted  for
only 29.5 percent  of value added  in manufacturing. 42" Such  figures are a dime a dozen  and similar
statements  could  be made about  many  other  developing  countries,  including  such populous  ones as
India, Egypt,  and China.  A nonnegligible  proportion  of investment  in public  enterprises  must be seen
as a form of conspicuous  consumption.  The work  force of these  enterprises  is a privileged  and
politically  influential  group,  and it is proving  very difficult  to plug this drain on development  funds  that
could be used far more  effectively  in such areas as education  and infrastructure.
9.6) Technological  Progress  and Its Implementation
Pondering  Evenson  and Westphal's  fundamental  chapter  is what led me to think of growth
accounting  from a source  and mediation  rather  than  from a use point  of view.
39 2:21:1126,  and Little  and Mirrlees  (1990).
40 Such project  evaluation  units  as do exist  are more  concerned  with such special  issues  as credit  terms and  the transfer
of pieces  of  technology  than  with applying  the elaborate  procedures  that  were devised  by Northern  economists.
41 3:45:2964,  3:43:2804-5;  the paper  cited is Kaufmann,  D. (1991).
42 3:40:2529.  The source  is Bardhan  (1984).
25In their view, technology  is "tacit",  i.e., each implementation  is specific;  it is "circumstantial"  so that
each materialization  reflects  special  conditions  and differs  from any other. In addition  to the original
invention  or the cost of securing  a right  to use it, the firm must acquire  the tacit knowledge
necessary  to make  the invention  work  and to adapt it to its environment.  Foreign  trade contacts,  the
human  capital embodied  in staff qualifications,  and other  factors  are also instrumental  to successful
implementation,  Schumpeter  would  add that some  credit  arrangement  will usually  have to be
worked  out. In the terrninology  of this section,  intermediation  must be arranged  to bridge  the gap
between  the source  and use of funds,  an intermediation  that is achieved  far more  easily in some
environments  than in others. Many  are the film directors  or computer  scientists  who went  to
Hollywood  or Silicon  Valley  to avoid  the tedious  struggle  involved  elsewhere  in collecting  funds  from
a collection  of public  aind  private  sources.  The fascinating  book by Doudintsev  (1958), published
during Khruschov's  rule,  describes  with painful  realism  the problems  of innovating  in the Soviet
economic  system.
Bardhan  evaluates  in his chapter  the contribution  of endogenous  growth  theory to research  on
development.  He points out that -- as is recognized  today -- this literature  has  to a significant  extent
rediscovered  intuitions  which played  a significant  role in the early literature  on growth.  The
emphasis  on balancedl  growth  makes  the work  a little irrelevant  since no developing  country  is
engaged  in such  a process.  The literature  has  however  helped  to set early ideas  on rigorous
foundations;  the work on innovations  in particular  sheds new light on the transmission  of technology
between  developing  and developed  countries.
10) The Outward-Oriented  Policies  Controversy
The quarrel  about export  oriented  strategies  is over among  politicians  -- a world-wide
consensus  recognizes  their superiority  and the list is short of the countries  whose  leaders  still
believe  in import  substitution 43. It will last  forever in  the quarrelsome  academic  world, and the
Handbook  editors had no  difficulty  in bringing  together  a wide palette  of pro and con views on
this topic. In addition  to the three  contributions  which set out the Marxian  and Latin  American
structuralist  views,  five chapters  discuss  trade policy,  which is also a key  focus of Anne
Krueger's  and Corbo  and Fischer's  discussions  of the history  of development  policies  and of
structural  adjustment.
And the academic  debate  should  continue,  because  why  outward  orientedness  appears  to be
so effective  is a mystery.  The controversy  is important  and merits  close scrutiny.
Trade  theory  teaches  that free trade is optimal  for countries  that are "small  in international
trade" (for which  export  and import  prices  are given).  As part of the artillery  of facts that he has
deployed  in so many  battles  against  import  substitution,  Balassa  points  out that the spectacular
increase  in trade of the Dragons  has  not harmed  their  terms of trade, so that the "small  country
assumption"  holds.  Are the gains  from trade large?  According  to the skeptics,  welfare  triangles
are so small that theiir  influence  on development  performance  can be disregarded.
Elementary  geometry  shows  that the areas of similar  triangles  are proportional  to the square of
any of their sides;  hence  the well known  result  that the cost of a small  departure  from free
43  Burma, Algeria, Afghanistan come into mind.
26trade is small to the second  order. Large  distortions  are for the same  reason  costly. For
example,  most of the gain from the Uruguay  Round,  as calculated  by applied  general
equilibrium  models,  stemmed  from the reduction  in  the initially  very high agricultural  protection;
little  was gained by reducing  the low tariffs  on manufactures 44.
Protection  levels  are high in many  developing  countries,  and in India  for example,  what is
discussed  currently  is a reduction  in the top tariff rate to the high  level of 40 percent,  and  the
removal  of prohibitions  that forbid the import  of most consumer  goods; protection  was far
higher  before  the liberalization  initiated  by the Rao government  in 1991.
The gains  from cutting  such  tariffs are not negligible.  AGE models  may be made  to produce
larger  gains by taking into  account  such departures  from the standard  trade model as
imperfect  competition,  increasing  returns,  and rent seeking  costs, and Bela Balassa  points  in
chapter  31 to estimates  that imply losses  of more  than 5 percent  of GNP in highly  protectionist
countries  (2:31:1671).  A volume  edited by Srinivasan  and Whalley  (1986)  presents  the most
complete  set of results  produced  under  more  standard  assumptions;  as Rodrik  notes
(3:45:2932),  such models  imply  welfare  losses  of a couple  of percents.
A relevant  issue is whether  the models  (and the trade  theory  they embody)  represent  the real
world properly.  To illustrate  the problem,  Korea's  exports  to GNP ratio  grew from 3.8 percent  to
31.8 percent  from 1960  to 1990  (Krueger,  3:40:2518).  1 remember  the conference  that
produced  the Srinivasan  Whalley  volume  which Rodrik  cites, and can say that none  of the
models  presented  could  have generated  such  a result  "cleanly",  i.e.,  without resorting  to
exogenous  coefficient  changes.  Models  that vastly understate  the trade increase  which results
from outward-oriented  policies  cannot  but understate  the resulting  welfare gain.
A source of confusion  is that the GNP figures  at constant  prices  distort  judgment  because  of an
index number  problem.  Helleiner 45 cites two studies  according  to which one third and 25 to 45
percent,  respectively,  of investments  by multinationals  lowered  income  and welfare in the host
country,  though  they earned  profit  for the foreign investor.  Those  investments  obviously  raised
the GNP in constant  market  prices  that economists  take too uncritically  to be a correct
measure  of development  performance.  This discrepancy  between  value added  at domestic
and world prices may account  for the fact that trade liberalization  in highly  protected  countries
in Latin  America and in the former Soviet  block,  which often  brings  about a protracted  period  of
slow growth,  tends  to be so popular  with domestic  users  that the policy  change  proves  to be
irreversible.  Likewise,  the spectacular  bank and chaebol  failures  following  moderate
liberalization  in Korea  leads one to suspect  that a not inconsiderable  part of that country's
spectacular  GNP growth  was accounted  for by investments  that were not truly profitable 46.
44 See  for example Waelbroeck,  Le Figaro  December  17 1993,  "Le coOt  mondial  du protectionnisme  agricole,"
written  in a controversy  with Maurice  Allais  who had  lent his Nobel  Prize  prestige  to the campaign  against  the
Uruguay  Round,  and had  castigated  as grossly  exaggerated  the OECD  and  World Bank  general  equilibrium
modelling  estimate  of those  gains.
45 2:27:1457;  the references  are  to Lall  and Streeten  (1976)  and  to Encarnacion  and  Wells  (1986).
46 Chapter  12 of Ginsburgh  and  Waelbroeck  (1981)  is the only  study I know  of that systematically  compares  the impact
of a shift  to free  trade on GNP  at  world and  tariff ridden  prices.  The  differences  are substantial,  even  though  the 40
percent  tariff levels  assumed  in their model  are  well below  the levels  attained  in many  developing  countries.
27The welfare cost of protection  is not negligible:  even if the 2 percent  figure is the correct  one,
the welfare  gain is too large  a chunk of output  to be  thrown away.  What is absurd  is the cost
imposed  on consumers  in relation  to the import  saving  and sales  gains for domestic  producers.
The last unit of imports  foregone  because  of a 100 percent  tariff has a resource  cost that is
twice that of buying  the good abroad.  The cost of protection  which  AGE models  calculate
appears  moderate  only because  high protection  does not conserve  much  foreign exchange,
and does not open up significant  markets  to domestic  producers;  it is because  import
substitution  does not work that welfare  gains  from tariff reductions  are not very large.
What is true is that the stakes of development  are on a different  scale.  India's  GNP,  for
example,  grew by 5.4 percent  on average  from 1980  to 1995, Korea's  by 4 percent  more; a 2
percent  nonrecurrent:  gain does pale in comparison  with a 4 percent annual  addition  to output
during 15 years. Remember  Stiglitz's  demonstration  that production  function  theory cannot
explain  why the per capita output  gap between  developed  and developing  countries  is so
large;  trade theory  too cannot  account  for the gap. Regretfully  development  economics,  to
which such great  minds have contributed  over more  than  two centuries  as W. Arthur Lewis's
chapter  reminds  us, idoes  not explain  why some countries  are much  more  successful  than
others  in economic  terms.
Following  an introduction  to the principles  of trade  policy in Bliss's  chapter,  Pack's  chapter
deals  with industrialization  and trade. He  sets out an interesting  "wide  steps" hypothesis"
according  to which "outward-oriented"  countries,  which  balance  import  protection  by export
incentives,  are able  to switch  readily  into net exports  when  they complete  the import
substitution  phase  for a good, smoothing  the process  of structural  change  that accompanies
development  of the path  of investment 47.
Balassa's  paper  is the most exhaustive.  He  shoots  down  such dead ducks  as dependency
theory,  the once popular  "delinking"  proposals  according  to which Southern  countries  should
cut themselves  off from Northern  ones,  and the concept  of the New International  Economic
Order (NIEO)  enforc,ed  through  a global  primary  commodities  cartel. He reviews  the post-war
history  of development,  trying  to understand  why outward  orientation  is so beneficial  to growth.
An outward-oriented  strategy  is defined  as one where  in the spirit of the Lerner's  symmetry
theorem,  import  protection  is compensated  by export  subsidies.
Balassa  is concerned  that economic  theory  does not explain  why outward  orientation  is so
beneficial,  and searches  for "dynamic  gains  from trade"  that might  clarify  the mystery.  Entirely
properly,  he complernents  cross-country  regressions  by in-depth  country  studies  based on a
personal  data base that he kept up to date  for ten years  after the first oil shock.  The reported
results  show  that outward-oriented  countries  have adjusted  better  to external  shocks,  and in
particular  have pursued  better macro  strategies  than  those resorted  to by users  of import
substitution  strategies.  They have also achieved  more  growth per unit of investment  and higher
rates of saving  than import  substituting  countries.  Estimates  of this sort have been replicated
by too many  excellent  authors  to be dismissed  by a curt remark  on the fragility  of cross-country
estimates.  A broad  spectrum  of policies  appears  to be associated  with the selection  of trade
strategies. Why this is so is unclear.
47 Balassa  makes  a similar  point  in chapter  31.
28The defense  of import  substitution  in Bruton's  chapter  cites  few facts. The hard meat is a
comparison  of an import-substituting  India,  with its keen  desire to master  advanced
technology,  an outward-oriented  Korea,  and an import-substituting  Brazil  that wishes to live as
Americans  do and has  for this reason  welcomed  investment  by foreign multinationals.  The
Korean  total factor productivity  growth  outshines  by a wide margin  those of the other countries
but Bruton  awards  the prize  to India,  on the basis of figures  that show  that domestic
construction  companies  have accounted  for a larger  share of domestic  construction  projects
and won more  foreign  construction  contracts  than Korean  ones. He  does not allow  for the bias
that because  India's  state sector  is so large,  and for political  reasons,  state companies
everywhere  give preference  to domestic  suppliers,  the construction  project  share is a poor
indicator  of technological  capabilities,  nor  for the fact that the world market  for construction
projects  is so corrupted  by subsidies  that Korea's  lower  share  may demonstrate  good
policies 48. Evenson  and Westphal  cite figures  on patents  in their chapter  that put Korea  well
ahead  of India on an aggregate  basis,  and far ahead  on a per capita  one 49. Bruton's
demonstration  that Brazil  did poorly,  finally, is hardly  a comfort  for believers  in the idea  that
inward-oriented  strategies  help  home grown  technologies  to bloom.
Rodrik's  subtle and healthily  skeptical  chapter  is the paper  that truly balances  Balassa's.
Adopting  a robustly  rigorous  approach,  he too goes on a duck shoot  and the sky is empty of
birds by the time he sets his weapon  aside.  Welfare  triangles  are small.  The regression  results
that suggest  that outward-oriented  strategies  have a large impact  on growth  are fragile. Recent
work using  strategic  trade theory  and endogenous  growth  theory  do not imply large impacts  of
trade policy on welfare,  and apart  from the papers  of Cox  and Harris  on NAFTA's  impact  on
the Canadian  economy 5 0, models  featuring  a combination  of scale  economies  with imperfect
competition  do not imply large  welfare  gains either.
Targeting  evidence  cited  by Balassa  and others  that outward  oriented  countries  have better
macro  policies,  save  more, and use resources  better  leads  Rodrik,  after noting  that there is no
theoretical  reason  why trade policy  could influence  so varied  domains  of economic  policy,  to
close by the sweeping  statement  that good  governance  is the key to development  success,  the
latter being  defined  in terms of the state's  ability  to discipline  private  groups.  A surprisingly
intuitive  conclusion  to a rigorous  paper, since  good governance  is in the onlooker's  eyes. That
the Korean  governance  which,  with that of Japan  and Taiwan,  Rodrik  regards  as a model  of
development  policy  making  is in any event  doubtful.  Krueger  notes  serious  errors of Korean
planners  in "picking  winners";  that country  has  two presidents  in jail for corruption  at the time of
writing as well as the son of the present  one, and the number  of chaebols  and banks  that are
bankrupt  as a result  of imprudent  borrowing  and lending  is growing  by the day; as a success
criterion,  governance  is as slippery  as an eel.
Still Rodrik  may be right, as well as the many  others  who have  jumped  on the governance
bandwagon,  and it is interesting  to note  that his conclusion  can be reconciled  with Balassa's
careful  demonstration  that outward  orientation  is positively  related  with a variety  of indicators  of
48 Korea  was extremely  successful  in winning  for close  to ten years  after  the oil shock a large  share of Middle  East
construction  projects,  but  witdrew  later  to a certain  extent  from  that market;  see Vogel  (1991)  pp 62-3.
49 Bruton  could not  foretell  when he wrote  the subsequent  success  of India's  software  industry  around Bangalore...  or
Korea's  success  as an exporter  of DRAM  computer  chips.
50 Which (Rodrik  does  not mention  this) uses  an unorthodox  price  function  that no other  modeler  has used.
29development  success,  if his  finding  is interpreted  as a correlation  and not as evidence  that
outward  orientation  has  a causal  effect  on the other indicators  of policy  performance.  Outward
orientation  is not "the cause"  of rapid  economic  growth,  but it is part of the winning
combination.
Before  considering  this hypothesis,  it is only fair to note  that the Handbook  points  to three
causal mechanisms  that could  account  for the correlations  that Balassa  estimates.  The Pack-
Balassa  "wide  steps" hypothesis  has been  mentioned.  Evenson  and Westphal  find that the
contacts  between  exporters  and foreign  sellers produce  a significant  transfer  of technology,
through the negotiations  about  the technical  specifications  of goods.  Evenson  and Westphal
find that outward  orientation  lowers  investment  costs.
Very high protection  makes  no sense.  Thus,  the correct  way  to interpret  Balassa's  results  is
that governments  that are decisive  enough  to resist absurd  demands  by protectionist  interests
are also able to defeat  the interest  groups  that block necessary  macroeconomic  adjustment
policies,  and press  the country's  authorities  to carry out prestigious  but ruinous  investment
projects 5'. Very high protection,  in this perspective,  is the smali but visible  tip of a much  larger
iceberg  of weak governance.  Cutting  away iceberg  tips is no more  helpful  in clearing  the sea
lanes  than introducing  at a stroke  free trade  without reforming  other policies  and not
surprisingly,  countries  that have decreed  large  cuts in tariffs in recent  years  without
complementing  this by other reforms,  have in most instances  re-established  high protection
soon after.
-11)  Structural  Adjustment  and the One  World Consensus
1  1.1)  The Evolution  of Policy  Making  in the South
The theoretical  chapter by Edwards  and van Wijnbergen  presents  the trade  theoretic
foundations  of adjustment  in terms of the Salter  (1959)  model  of how countries  adjust  to
resource  gains and losses  stemming  from capital  flows or terms of trade changes,  which
modify  the aggregate  supply  of resources,  and to changes  in relative  prices induced  by home
policies.  General  equilibrium  theory  with rationing  is used  to investigate  the time path of
adjustment.
The key chapters  are those by Krueger  and by Corbo  and Fischer.  Krueger  provides  a
valuable  perspective  on the sweeping  policy  changes  that have occurred  in the South  since
the war, pieces  of that information  have  been cited  in this paper.  Corbo and Fischer  mostly
focus on the recent  past.
Both chapters  recount  the World Bank's  1979  decision  to devote  a substantial  portion  of its
resources  to "structural  adjustment  loans"  in support  of policy  reform in  the developing  world,
in close cooperation  with the International  Monetary  Fund;  after the 1982  debt crisis,  these
loans became  a major  component  of what  was left of North-South  capital  flows. Fischer  and
51 The same remark applies to Kaufmann's result, cited above, that the rate of return on projects is higher in countries
where macroeconomic management is better than in others. Here also, all that the regression demonstrates may be
that well governed countries both handle macroeconomic difficulties more effectively, and get a better return from
investment projects.
30Corbo  focus at first on theoretical  issues,  discussing  the sustainability  of borrowing,  the optimal
speed and sequencing  of reform  programs,  and the fact that adjustment  policies  must be
credible  to be effective.  They survey  econometric  appraisals  of this lending,  which are beset  by
selection  biases. Case  studies  describe  the adjustment  experience  of Chile,  Ghana,  and New
Zealand.  The chapter  is complemented  by Rodrik's  valuable  remarks  on the macroeconomics
of adjustment.
By far the most important  observation  is that although  structural,  market  oriented  reforms  do
eventually  bring  about a deep and beneficial  transformation  of over-protected  and over-
controlled  economies,  the process  is astonishingly  slow. Chile  suffered  a bad relapse  a decade
after adjustment  was initiated,  as did Mexico  (which  Corbo  and Fischer,  writing  before  the 1994
crisis,  view as a successful  adjuster).  Ghana remains  highly  dependent  on foreign aid, and
cannot  as yet be said to be on a self sustaining  development  path, while  in New Zealand  too
the fruits of adjustment  were very late in ripening.  Why this is so is a puzzle.
11.2) A "Washington Consensus" -- or a "One World" Consenus
However  high  the cost, there  is no let up in the shift to market  oriented  policies,  and several
authors of the Handbook's  volume  3 comment  on the emergence  of a new consensus  during
the decade  and a half  that followed  the 1982  debt shock.  Here is a list of the points of
agreement  that define  this.
--  Macroeconomic balance is necessary to growth.
--  Financing  industrialization  by taxing agriculture  worsens  the distribution  of incomes
and reduces  agricultural  production  significantly.
--  Reneging  on foreign debts is not an option.
--  Trade policy  should  be disciplined  by the World  Trade Organization  (WTO) rules
(which  imply  stable and moderate,  not necessarily  low protection).
--  Public  enterprises  are with  few exceptions  very inefficient  and should  be either
privatized,  or if that is politically  impossible,  exposed  to the discipline  of the market.
--  Property rights should be secure.
--  Economic  equality,  which  should  be a major goal, should  be achieved  principally
by "enabling"  the poor through  education  and an improved  access  to health
facilities.
--  Governments  should  relax  their control  of such commanding  heights  of the
economy  as banks  and capital markets.
--  Convertibility  is desirable,  restrictions  to foreign  investment  should  be relaxed.
This set of beliefs  is commonly  referred  to as the "Washington  consensus",  a term coined  by
Williamson  (1990)  who reportedly  regrets  it, as well he might.  After setting  out why the term is
misleading,  the set of beliefs  will be renamed  the "one  world consensus".
31The name is not groundless.  The World Bank  did decide  three years  before  the debt shock  to
transform  itself into  a rnajor  provider  of an assortment  of credits  among  which the best known
have been its Structural  Adjustment  Loans  (SALs);  these were granted  in cooperation  with the
International  Monetary  Fund,  which  conditioned  its lending  more  and more  on market  oriented
reforms  in addition  to rnacroeconomic  ones.  For some  years,  many  countries  had access  to no
other significant  source of funds,  which  strengthened  the influence  of the Pennsylvania  Avenue
twins.
This being  said, the term is unfortunate  in reinforcing  the common  man's  delusion  that our
globe  is run by a few thousand  bureaucrats  and politicians  around  Washington's  Mall.  The
Bank  and Fund  are better  described  as intellectual  sponges  than as leaders.  As the world's
largest pool of Ph.D.s,  they draw in the latest  ideas of academics  including  those  from the
South 52, while  their policy  of recruiting  mainly  staff  with some  experience  brings  in the
experience  of practical  men,  some  of whom had significant  authority  in countries  to which they
may return  to resume  a political  role.  And of course,  in the acrimony  of Bank  and Fund
missions,  their staff rub ideas against  the strong  convictions  of public  servants  and politicians
in the South -- a fruitful exchange for both sides.
Finally  as Corbo and Fischer  note 53, compliance  with conditionality  has been  low. Who can
force borrowers,  once standard  measures  such  as devaluation  and budget  cuts have
assuaged  the crisis,  to put commitments  which  they dislike  into effect?
There  is in every  developing  country,  whether  democratic  or not, a vigorous  policy  debate  that
draws on the memory  of past problems  and the example  of successful  countries,  and is
everywhere  distorted by interest  groups. It is that debate  that has moved  policy  thinking  from
the Indian  Congress  consensus  to the current  one.
It is not obedience  to VVashington  bodies  that has kept Mexican  and Argentinean  reforms  on
track in the recent  past:  despite  severe  difficulties.  India's 1991  balance  of payments  crisis  is
history  but reform  has continued  through  several  changes  of government,  even  though large
foreign  exchange  reseives  insulate  the country  from outside  pressures.  The new consensus's
domestic  roots are illustrated  by the conversions  of such leading  radical  politicians  as Michael
Manley  of Jamaica,  Jerry Rawlings  of Ghana,  and now Desire  Kabila  of Congo,  who after
fighting  with Guevara  to uphold Lumumba's  ideas and keeping  alive for years  a small guerrilla
war against Mobutu,  has announced  that he  will run Congo  on market  lines 54. The most glaring
illustration  of the sponge  theory  is China,  where no conditionality  inspired  Deng's  reforms  while
a deep influence  goes from China  to Washington,  as Bank  and Fund  economists  try to
understand  what China  has done  right,  to enrich  their dialogue  with other developing
countries".
52 There is a direct  flow too from Northern  (principally  US)  universities  to Southern  policy  circles,  exemplified  by
Indonesia's  Berkeley  Boys  in Indonesia  and  the Chicago  Boys  who  influenced  Chile's  policies  in the initial  years  of
Pinochet's  regime;  the influence  in Mexico  of  American  university  graduates  has been  significant  in recent  years.
53  1:44:2890,  citing  Edwards  (1989).
54 A few radical  leaders,  such as Cheddi  Jagan  of Guyana,  stuck  to their  beliefs  to the end.
55 As another  illustration  of the sponge  hypothesis  the Fund,  quite  skeptical  at first about  Argentina's  experiment  with a
currency  board,  has made  such a reform  a condition  of assistance  to Bulgaria  (Financial  Times  March  26 1997  "An
idea  whose  time has come").
32Finally,  conditionality  is often  welcomed  by governments,  which  are grateful  that the Bank  and
Fund  are available  to serve as scapegoats  for necessary  but unpopular  measures.
A good name for the consensus  is to dub it the "one  world consensus";  here are some
justifications.
--  Above all, developing  countries  have become  confident  in their ability  to withstand
pressures  that could  bring back  forms of colonialism.  As Morawetz  noted 56, whatever
policy  errors  were made  in the initial  years,  their economies  became  much  stronger  in
the first quarter  century  after independence;  this progress  continues.
--  The break-up  of the Soviet  Union  made obsolete  the concept  of a "Third  World",  which
had defined  itself  in terms of its refusal  to be involved  in the East-West  conflict,  and
used  the cold war to extract  aid from both parties.
--  The developing  countries'  failure  to join forces  to create  a New International  Economic
Order  undermined  the Third  World  concept.
--  Trade has  become  more  and more important  to the South.  Policy  makers  there have
become  aware  that their  efforts  to secure  "special  and differential  treatment"  from the
North  were not producing  results,  and was keeping  them out of the bizarre  but very
profitable  barter in trade  concessions  that thrives  in the gardens  by Lake Geneva.
--  And last but not least,  an increasing  number  of countries  are looking  forward to the
hopefully  not  too far off day when  they will join the developed  world; it's hard to form an
union  when many  workers  hope  to become  bosses
Which brings us back  to Streeten's  pivotal  Handbook  chapter,  which he wrongly  described  as
utopian.  The world has been shifting  to a consensual  system  where  countries  accept
international  obligations  more  willingly  than in the past, and pay  greater heed  to international
public  opinion.  The Uruguay  Round,  for example,  which India  and Brazil  tried to oppose  by
forming a block of Southern  countries,  has  stiffened  the trade disciplines  which WTO members
must respect.  Supported  by public  opinion,  the Bank  and Fund  and other  donors  are becoming
more  forthright  in pressing  countries  to fight corruption  and promote  democracy,  while  various
non governmental  organizations  are  fostering  the birth  of a true world public  opinion,  whose
pressure  has led the United  Nations  into peace-keeping  operations,  while Nato  and the
European  Union  are playing  a stabilizing  role in Eastern  Europe.
Streeten's  world  government  is not in sight but the shift away  from the nation  state ideal  that
was taken  for granted  after the war, and the rising  willingness  of countries  to submit  to quasi-
legal  obligations,  are moving  the world in its direction.
12) Income  Distribution  Policies  in the One  World Consensus
56  Morawetz  (1978)  documents  the  significant  progress  that  developing  countries  achieved  during  the  first  quarter
century  after  independance.
33Lipton  and Ravallion's  pivotal  chapter  41 surveys  the history  of thinking  on poverty  and the key
research  findings  in this area.  Apart from dissenting  voice on some important  issues in
Adelman  and Robinson's  chapter,  the Handbook  suggests  that economists  have  achieved  a
wide agreement  about  poverty  policies;  I shall  cite other  Handbook  references  to research
results  only where disagreement  exists, or where  the material  goes significantly  beyond  that
chapter.
Lipton  and Ravallion  are wrong  to accept 57 the statement  by Keynes  (1923)  that "there  was no
variation in the lot of the unskilled  (European)  laborers  in the two thousand  years... to the
France  of Louis  XIl",  and in implying  that concern  about poverty  began  in the Britain  of the
eariy industrial  revolution;  there had been  periods  of sustained  progress  of living  standards  in
the Italian and Flernish  cities and in the Netherlands,  fostering  legislation  that spread  to the
poor the benefits  of this progress  (and already,  as described  by Garnsey  (1988), in Rome  at
the time of the Gracchi,  and in Athens  at the time of that city's greatness),  but making  the point
less Anglo-Centric  only reinforces  the view that development  incites  efforts  to distribute  its
fruits more  widely. Lipton  and Ravallion  are right  to suggest  that a century  of thinking  in the
North on this topic fostered  an interest  in income  distribution  in the South  even before
development  had borne its fruits.
As in other  areas,  a number  of ideas  that were widely  accepted  in the early days have not
been supported  by later research.  Kuznets'  inverted  U, according  to which development
worsens income  distribution  at first and improves  it later it is too simple,  the causes  of changes
in income  distribution  are too complex  to be reduced  to so simple a pattern.  As mentioned,  the
belief  that improving  the nutrition  of the poor by raising  their incomes  or providing  them with
cheap  food would  trigger a virtuous  circle by making  them more  productive  has not been
supported  either.  T  he views of a number  of early development  economists,  who advocated
financing developnient  by "extracting  a surplus  from agriculture"  were abandoned  as
economists  took note of their negative  impact  on the poor,  many  of whom live in the
countryside.
Another simplistic  idea  which research  has  not confirmed  is that the poor are the chief
sufferers  from macroeconomic  adjustment  policies.  Concern  about such an effect has however
been valuable  in stimulating  the search  for ways to mitigate  the impact  of adjustment  policies
on the poor.
The dominant  strand  of thinking  about poverty,  a component  of Nehru's  thinking  already, is.that
trickle down works,  even though  the example  of Kerala  demonstrates  that much can be
achieved  even in slow growing  states.  That more  can be done to achieve  "pro-poor  growth"
has come  to be axiomatic 58. Linking  growth  with redistribution  can be a key component  of a
social contract  which can sustain  the political  stability  of developing  societies  which, as Lipton
and Ravallion  note,  are shifting  toward  a more  consensual  relation  between  the state and civil
society;  embedding  such a linkage in development  policy  is necessary  too because
development  undermines  the systems  of mutual  support  that provide  security  in traditional
societies.
57 3:41:2554.
58 C.f. the influential volume by Chenery et al (1974).
34The poverty  gap is not large in absolute  terms -- about 1 percent  of consumption  in the South
for the poorest  fifth of the developing  world's population 59, but targeting  problems  make  this
figure meaningless.  Combating  poverty  by direct  transfers  is impractical  given  the tight budget
situation  of developing  country  governments,  which  have to allocate  large funds  to
development  needs. Such  transfers  are  "net loss"  policies,  because  the dead-weight  loss of
taxes is not negligible.
In chapter  20, that discusses  South  Asia almost  exclusively,  Stern and Ahmad point out that
the tightness  of the budgetary  situation  is in part of the governments'  own making.  A much
greater part of the tax burden  should  be shifted  to land, possibly  subject to taxing large and
small land holdings  differently,  but the political  power  of land owners  has prevented  this. The
study of tax laws reveals  a host of absurd  distortions  that could be eliminated.  The chapters by
both Lipton  and Ravallion  and Jimenez  emphasize  that governments  could  do much  more  to
offset by user charges  the cost of roads and other utilities,  which often benefit mainly  well off
individuals.
Binswanger,  Deininger  and Feder's  chapter  provides  a valuable  analysis  of the history  of
property  rights  in agriculture.  Today's  rights  are often  the legacy  of brutal conquest  and/or the
efforts of landowners  to bias in their  favor the laws that regulate  property  rights.  The message
is not that sweeping  land reform  should  be instituted  in the South  -- efforts  to redistribute  land
have led to disappointing  results  -- but that a better  understanding  of this history  could prevent
serious  errors  whenever  property  rights  are redesigned.
Some  points are the following.  Except  in clearly identified  circumstances,  the owner occupied
farm is the most productive  form of organization.  In countries  where "land to the tiller"
legislation  discouraged  the rental  of land, as in Latin  America,  large  estates  have sometimes
developed  as a device  for establishing  control over  labor power.  "Titling",  the establishment  of
individual  property rights  over land  that was owned  communally,  may be useful  at advanced
levels  of development  to enable  farmers  to secure mortgage  loans, but has  been a widespread
source  of abuse.
Dasgupta  and Maler's  chapter  expands  on that remark  as it discusses  the connection  between
changes  in rural property  rights  and poverty.  The leading  idea is that although  a broad
redistribution  of land is rarely  a practical  policy  option, a great  deal can be done to help the
poor by controlling  the process  through  which local commons  are  transformed  into private
property.  The pressure  on resources  which development  and population  growth bring about
brings  about this transformation,  cutting  off the poor's  access  to those resources.  Much  of the
chapter is devoted  to the management  of local  commons.  which make a significant  contribution
to the livelihood  of the poor.  State intervention  has often had nefarious  consequences,  by
replacing  by ill thought out rules,  devised  centrally,  customs  that reflected  a consensual
understanding  of local  scarcities;  the chapter  discusses  how such situations  should  be
managed.
13)  Tying Up Loose  Ends
59 3:41:2584.
35Clearly  by design,  the Handbook  opens  on a resolutely  agnostic  note  with respect  to received
economic  theory.  All three  of the first chapters,  by Sen, Lewis,  and Bardhan,  are openly  or
implicitly  critical of it. Sen  sets out an alternative  vision  of the development  process,  Lewis
criticizes  the long  disregard  of economists  for development,  while Bardhan  -- a subtle theorist
who has a deep understanding  of what  he criticizes,  opens  his contribution  with warlike  words
bout  the limited  usefulness  of orthodox  economics.  Arida and Taylor's  chapter  6 also is
unorthodox,  and dispersed  through  the work, other  chapters  challenge  orthodoxy.
In this paper, I have been at pains  to check mark  areas where  orthodox  economics  does not
clarify  important  issues.  These  are our discipline's  "loose  ends";  the time has come  to attempt
to tie them together.  There is no pretense  of defining  a new paradigm,  the only goal is to bring
together  in a new  way existing  ideas, in the hope  of contributing  to the ongoing  debate  on
methodology  in the economic  profession.
13.1)  "Releasing...  the Latent  Talent  and Creativity  of the Common  Man,"" 0
Capabilities  and Functionings
Amartya  Sen's chapter 1 provides  an excellent  organizing  framework  by proposing  a way of
formalizing  the process  of development  in a way  that is more  flexible  than  the standard  one.
He suggests  to judge development  performance  in terms of unusual  criteria.  The argument  is
not easy to follow because  the concepts  are new and the author  likes to redefine  his concepts
in slightly  different,  carefully  nuanced  ways;  the lack of space  will make  it impossible  to convey
all shades  of his  thinking 6 ".
He proposes  to judge development  performance  in terms of three concepts,  among  which
entitlements  are a generalized  version  of the budget  sets of mathematical  economists,
redefined  as the set of allocations  that individuals  can realize  subject  to market  conditions  and
legislation.  A slave could have an entitlement.
The key innovation  is the view that the primary  concern  of economics  ought not to be
commodities  but actions,  represented  by the twin concepts  of capabilities  and functionings.
Jumping  back  to Aristotle's  writings,  Sen argues  that what men are interested  in is "doings"
and "beings".  Freedom  matters,  a starving  man and a fasting  one have  identical  functionings
but their capabilities  are utterly  different,  thus both capabilities  and functionings  matter.
Sen's  formulation  has  two merits  from this paper's  perspective.  It is closer to what humans  find
important,  for what they remember  when examining  their lives is what they have been and
done, commodities  matter  only in relation  to such  functions  as procuring  nourishment,  or
acquiring  a car to go to work and take the family  to the country  on weekends.  Being  the best
paid  actor in Hollywood  may be more  important  than  the commodities  that the money buys.
The formulation's  other merit is that it opens  economics  to concerns  that do not fit easily into its
usual  domain.  It is open to all that humans  care  about,  and provides  a richer picture  of
60 Nehru  (1989)  p 400.
61 For an application  of the approach,  see Dreze  and Sen (1989).
36development  than a perspective  that views it primarily  in terms of the supply  of commodities  to
62 consumers
Through  its link with freedom,  the concept  of capabilities  sets into a common  perspective
concerns  expressed  by the Handbook's  Marxians,  which standard  theory  cannot apprehend  so
readily.  The emphasis  on the value of freedom  helps  to grasp the concern  of dependency
theory, for example,  as it examines  how countries  in the "periphery"  see the fruits of their
development  effort  slip willy nilly into  the hands  of countries  in the "centre".  The more
interesting  parts  of structuralist  economics  describe  countries  that are trapped  by the rigidities
of their economic  structure.  Roemer 63 suggested  using the concept  of the core of an economy
to describe  situations  where  the capabilities  of agents  or countries  are constrained  by
prohibitions  which block  certain  economic  opportunities,  in the way described  by Nehru  as he
assesses  British  rule.
The concept  also sets in a novel perspective  the discussion  on interlinked  contracts.  Economic
organization  theory has pointed  out that those contracts  are an optimal  adaptation  to situations
of asymmetric  information.  The concept  of capabilities  makes  it obvious  that their negotiation
pits agents against  each other,  one of whom has  many  partners  while  the other's  choice is
much more  restricted,  as other  possible  partners  do not know him  as well as his habitual
partner.  The potential  for exploitation  is obvious,  especially  when  the weak agent does not
have the character  and intellectual  ability  needed  to bargain  effectively.  Development,  which
replaces  interlinked  by standard  contracts,  has thus a liberating  effect  that has value. There
are many  other  ways in which  development  and development  policies  have a liberating  impact,
the migration  to the city of a family member  strengthens  the bargaining  situation  of other
members  in situations  where market  failure  might  compel  them  to give up  their land or to
commit  a family member  to debt bondage.  By loosening  family  and village  ties, Hirschmanian
"exit"  through migration  makes  children  freer but may put older individuals  or widows  in a
difficult  situation,  as their children's  migration  to the cities  makes  them freer by insulating  them
from social pressures;  i.e., one consequence  of development  is a need  to provide  public
support  of the old 64.
Sen's perspective  also casts a different  light on the costs of bureaucratic  over-regulation,
which economists  have  tended  to view primarily  as an obstacle  to foreign  trade  and
investment.  The initial  enthusiasm  for planning  and for a "hard  state"  has created  a new
exploitative  class  which paralyzes  today  the "latent  creativity  and freedom of the common
man", as cruelly as the zamindars  whom Nehru  vowed  to eradicate  . Freeing  the common  man
from bureaucracy  is a way  to expand  his capabilities.
Sen's  concept  also casts in a novel  setting  the findings  on health  and education  that are
presented  in the Handbook.  Stating  that education  enhances  the capabilities  of women, while
health makes  humans  more  able to assume  a respected  social  role, is an enlightening  way of
viewing  their benefits.
62 The focus  of economics  was not always  so narrow  and Schumpeter  takes  time to describe  in much  detail  the
motivations  of  the entrepreneur  whom  he describes.
63 C.f. Evans'  2:24:1266  many  references  to Roemer's  work.
64 C.f.  the discussion  in the section  on private  savings.
37Nothing  is very new in this sub-section.  What has been said could  have been expressed  within
the traditional  confines  of modern  economics.  The added  value  is in casting  problems  that
seemed unrelated  into an unified  framework.
13.2)  "Being  for Myself,  Who  Am l?" Collective  Action
"I am for myself,  for if not who is for me; and being  for myself,  who am I" wrote Rabbi  Hillel in the
Talmud 65. I discoverecl  the citation  while browsing  Arrow's  collected  works  in an American
colleague's  office,  who had been  delayed  by traffic;  the Nobel  Laureate  was obviously  right in
thinking  that the saying points  to a gap in the current  paradigm  of economics.  Here  the open
endedness  of Sen's  vocabulary  is valuable.  The standard  trick in microeconomics  of dealing  with
man's  concern  for othesrs  by injecting  altruistic  terms into his utility  function  is totally  artificial,  while
generosity  and the respect  earned  through  giving  are very natural  components  of Sen's  "beings  and
doings".
Man is a social animal,  as Edward  Wilson,  the father of socio-biology  points  out as he tries to clarify
our motivations  by studying  other  social  species.  The colossal  ant hill that mankind  has erected  is
not sustained  only by prices.  Concern  for our fellows  and the desire to earn their respect  are
necessary  to its functioning.
Closer  to the economist's  home  ground  is Mancur  Olson's  work on collective  action 66 which Justin
Yifu and Jeffrey Nugent  discuss in their chapter,  together  with  the relevant  ideas  of such economists
as Hirschman  (1970).  Olson's  key contribution  is to point out the contradiction  between  the interests
of a group and of its members,  as a result  of which collective  action must be sustained  by agreed
punishments,  which discourage  free riding,  and eliminate  the contradiction  between  individual  and
group interest.  In the standard  definition  of collective  action,  as formulated  by Srinivasan5 7 for
example,  participation  in collective  action  is determined  by the personal  interests  of individuals.
Interpreting  motivations  in terms of Sen's beings  and doings  extends  the range of motivations  to
altruistic  "being  for myself,  who am I" concerns  in addition  to economic  motivations  of the traditional
variety;  the desire for honor  and the fear of shame,  so readily  expressed  in terms of Sen's
functionings  concept,  are important  motors  of such  economic  action as strikes  or mass protests
about unemployment.
The popularity  of Olson's  work has unfortunately  embedded  in many  economists'  minds  the idea
that collective  action is a rather  special  behavior  of interest  group  members.  The firm is an example
too (for example  the emphasis  on firm culture  in courses  on management).  So are families  (the
strength  of family  ties in the developing  world).  And recognizing  this, business  leaders  send key
personnel  on grueling  wilderness  weekends  to foster "bonding"  among  their staff; every institution  is
a locus of collective  action.
The crucial  observation  is that, to borrow  Evenson  and Westphal's  felicitous  terminology,  the
effectiveness  of collective  action  is "tacit  and circumstantial".  Tacit because  even  the members  of a
group cannot be sure of how their colleagues  will react  to a challenge;  circumstantial  because  it
65 Cohen  (1982)  p 238; my  translation.
66 Olson (1965). I do not discuss his second book, the conclusions of which are more questionable.
67 3:2117.
38coalesces  most strongly in the face of an exceptional  challenge.  It is both potentially  powerful,  and
fragile.
Three rules guide  collective  action.
--  The threat rule:  humans  close ranks  when, rightly  or wrongly,  they perceive  that their
group is in danger.
--  The fairness  (or non  free riding)  rule:  humans  are  willing  to make sacrifices  only if they
are persuaded  that others  will not free ride on their sacrifice.
--  The circumstantial  rule:  the historical  context  is important;  the character  and ability  of
the group's leader  is important  for the success  of its action.  Failure  weakens,  and
success  reinforces  collective  action.
The emphasis  on fairness  in discussions  about trade  policy has puzzled  trade economists,  who find
it difficult  to provide  an economic  explanation  of such practices  as the legalization  of anti-dumping
duties in the General  Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade  (GATT) 6", or the exalted  status of the Most
Favored  Nations  Clause  as article 1 of that Agreement.  These  can be explained  readily  in terms of
the fairness rule,  as a way of safeguarding  collective  action by systems  of penalties  enforced  in a
quasi  judicial manner.  The GATT is indeed  a locus  of collective  action,  and political  opinion
supported  successive  GATT rounds  only because  it could be convinced  that what  voters viewed  as
their country's  sacrifices  was compensated  fairly  by the opening  up of other  countries  to exports.
The connection  between  the threat rule and Corden's  (1974)  conservative  welfare  function is worthy
of note  too. That author once proposed  to represent  by an asymmetric  "conservative  welfare
function"  the fact that interest  groups  fight much  harder  to oppose  tariff cuts than to raise them. This
tendency  of humans  to respond  asymmetrically  to gains and losses provides  a ready explanation  of
the success  of Chenery's  "redistribution  with growth"  concept,  and explains  why Adelman  and
Robinson,  Lipton  and Ravallion,  Binswanger  et al, Dasgupta  and Maler,  and other Handbook
authors accept  so readily  that efforts  to combat  poverty  should  reserve  for the poor a share of the
fruits of growth rather  than redistribute  existing  wealth.
As Vogel (1991)  and many  others  have noted,  it was under  threat  that the Four Dragons  performed
their economic  miracle:  collective  action produced  the "bonding"  that made  them submit  to state
guidance  and discipline;  copying  in other  developing  countries  the methods  of the government  of
Park Chung  Hee might  lead  to disaster.  The Korean  and Taiwanese  miracles  are, in fact, but the
latest examples  of countries  that achieved  remarkable  success  in a situation  of great national
danger,  thus the prosperity  of Athens  was established  at a time when a third Persian  invasion
seemed  possible,  that of Venice  during  a 16 years  war against  Turkey (the  war of the wasp and the
bear as Braudel  (1983 p 136) describes  it, which  the wasp won); Holland's  golden age coincided
with an 80 years  war against  Spain,  the most powerful  nation  in Europe  at the time.
It is simply not true that Korea and Japan,  the classic  "hard  states"  have benefited  from admirably
sapient  governance.  Japan closed  only in 1997  coal mines  that produced  fuel at thrice  the world
price.  France,  Belgium,  and Britain  acted  far more  decisively.  It betted  heavily  on a "fifth generation
68 Now in the WTO.
39computer"  based  on artificial  intelligence  and missed  the desk  top machine 69. As Krueger  reminds
us in her chapter,  Korea's  heavy  investment  in steel, heavy  chemicals,  and automobile  industries,
were less  successful  than had been  hoped,  and their  cost squeezed  out the country's  dynamic  small
and medium  enterprises7 0; planning  decisions  were not prescient,  but the hard work induced  by a
sense of national  destiny made  them  work. Thanks  to democratization,  with  two former Presidents
of Korea and the son of a3  third in jail, we know that there was no perfect  "fairness"  in the way in
which the fruits of the collective  effort  were shared 7 '.
Firms too are locuses  of collective  action,  and it is the willingness  of all members  to set aside
rivalries  and personal  interests  to save  their  jobs which accounts  for the often  extraordinary
improvements  in performance  of enterprises  that are threatened  by bankruptcy.  Janos Kornai,  a
Hungarian  economist,  has called  "hard  budget  constraint"" 2, the market  rule that loss making  firms
must close down under  clearly  defined  bankruptcy  rules.  " "When  a man knows  he is to be hanged
in a fortnight, it concentrates  his mind  wonderfully"  Samuel  Johnson  has  said, and many  are the
examples  where  firms achieved  astonishing  increases  in productivity  when their staff understood
that they must adapt to survive.  Kornai's  idea has broad  applicability.  A Chilean  company,  in the
import  substituting  days,  faced no true hard budget  constraint,  since its few home market
competitors  were partners  in a cozy  cartel  while  it could rely  on the government  to hike protection  to
transfer  to consumers  thie  consequences  of management  errors.  The Korean  government,  on the
other hand,  was very interventionist,  but it granted  subsidies  reluctantly" 3 and Korean  firms, knowing
that subsidies  might  trigger anti-dumping  duties in key markets,  knew  that they could not obtain
shelter  from market  forces.
Finally,  the "tacit  and circumstantial"  power  of collective  action can  harm as well as help
development.  The "hard state"  of Korea  is discovering  this as strikes  and student  protest  show
how a tradition  which fueled  the Korean  miracle  can be captured  and harnessed  by interest
groups  that oppose  the labor  market  reforms  that economic  circumstances  have made
necessary.
13.3)  "A Million  Mutinies"  and Structural  Adjustment
Corbo  and Fischer  drew attention  to the excruciating  slowness  of structural  adjustment;  here
also we are reminded  of the thinking  of the neo-radicals,  here the Latin  American  structuralists
who believed  that the structural  rigidities  of their economies  ruled  out other  policy  alternatives.
Such reform  has eventually  been  successful  but the cost has been very high.  What accounts
for this?
69 Taiwan did not.
70 1 do not discuss Taiwanese planning. According to Vogel (1991), Taiwan was less interventionist than Korea; still the
economy  was firmly  guided.
71 The  power  of Korea's  feared  KCIA  remains  nevertheless  considerable.
72 Kornai  (1990);  see pages  62 and ff. in particular.
73 Support  was provided  as al  rule through  loans  from banks  that were  closely  controlled  by planners.
40In his fascinating  book "A Million  Mutinies",  Naipaul 74 describes  after a long visit to India,  the
deeply  individual  but traumatic  "mutinies"  of a number  of young Indians  as they sought to adapt
to a rapidly  changing  society,  modifying  their value  systems  in the process.  What he describes
are the difficulties  and trauma  which Nehru  surely  foresaw  as he stated  that "in India
especially,  where  we have been  wedded  far too long  to past forms and modes  of thought and
action,  new experiences,  new processes,  leading  to new ideas  and new horizons,  are
necessary.  Thus  we will change  the static character  of our living  and make it more  dynamic
and vital, and our minds  will become  active  and adventurous 75."
The Indians  whose  life Naipaul  describes  are young,  they have gone  through the mutinous
years  of adolescence  and early  adulthood  when individuals  question  their parents'  values as
they select  and define  their role in society.  Emulation  is crucial  and like China,  the country  of a
million millionaires  which  is full of Horatio  Algier  tales of young  men and women  who become
rich swiftly, it is beginning  to be said in India  that 76 "we are all baniyas"  as young Indians  dream
of launching  businesses  or creating  software  companies  in Bangalore.
Again it is worth  quoting  Edward  Wilson 77, as the father of socio-biology  points  to the unique
variety  and flexibility  of roles in human  societies,  which distinguishes  us from other  social
species.  Wilson does not relate roles  to age and emphasizes  their plasticity  of which examples
come  to mind,  such  as Tolstoi  who was successively  a rake,  a soldier,  a novelist  and a saint,
but as Naipaul's  book implies,  age does influence  role selection.  Common  language  refers  to
the "formative  age"  and of a "time  for settling  down";  it is said wryly  that "you can't teach an old
dog new  tricks".
The "old  dog" saying  suggests  that the connection  of roles with age may have a biological
basis,  but it is readily  accounted  for in economic  terms. Handbook  authors  who discuss  rural
urban  migration  note  that the decision  to migrate,  which involves  a large initial  investment  in
terms of money and of the psychological  cost of sundered  friendships,  should be made early
so that the cost can be amortized  over a long period 78. Again  Sen's perspective  is valuable  as
roles are obviously  examples  of the "beings  and doings"  to which he wants  to draw the
attention  of economists.  Migration  is but one "functioning"  that is involved  in role selection,
education  is another,  as well as the decision  about  whether  and when to found a family, but
beside  such economic  acts are non economic  ones such  as fashioning  one's personality  for
the chosen  role and building  up  the work  ethics  and convictions  that are compatible  with it;
given  caste prejudices,  the "we are all Baniyas  now"  quip does reveal  how role selection  may
entail  changes  in deeply  embedded  personal  values.
The market  must be served  by businessmen,  labor union  leaders,  and public  officials  who
understand  and respect  its mechanisms  and ethics. It is a frequent remark  by students  of the
transition  from socialism  that those  who were over  thirty when the Soviet Block  broke up will
74 Naipaul  (1990),  a writer  of Indian  origin,  was born in Trinidad  and describes  in many  of his works how  cultural
differences  complicate  the choice  of a place  in society.
75 Nehru  (1989)  pp 408-9.
76 The business  caste,  traditionally  held in low esteem.
77 Wilson (1975),  in particular  pp 554-5.
78 Modigliani's  (1970)  lifetime  income  hypothesis,  which  does not involve  a large  initial  commitment,  is different  from this
point of view.
41never adapt fully  to the new system.  "Embourgeoisement  is a lengthy  historical  process"
Kornai  observes 79, as he emphasizes  the importance  of the civic principles  and values  that are
associated  with a market  system.
Starting  from a blank p.age  has  advantages.  Japan,  with its large number  of demobilized
soldiers  and repatriates  just after the war, Korea,  where  a quarter  of the population  were
refugees  about 195380,  Hong  Kong's  large inflow  of immigrants  including  ruined  Shanghai
industrialists,  the arrival  of troops  and other  migrants  into  Taiwan;  even Singapore  has
benefited  from such a stimulus  as a result  of the island's  unusually  broad  population  mix,
including  a Chinese  population  that is far less homogeneous  than that of Hong  Kong. Last  but
not least, Mao  created  a gigantic  blank  page  through  the cultural  revolution,  which  forced many
tens of millions  of people  to migrate  to the countryside  and caused  vast migration  flows
between  provinces.  It is interesting  that the German  post-war  miracle  also coincided  with large
movements  of uprooted  individuals  who had no alternative  apart  from rethinking  their role in
society81.
The Latin American  structuralist  school  had foreseen  that rigidities  would  make market
oriented  reforms  costly.  The rigidity  of the capital  stock would be a main cause of those
problems;  events  suggest  that the rigidity  of the roles that humans  assign  themselves  has
been  the more  serious  obstacle.
13.4)  "Carrying  Out a New Plan," 82 the Entrepreneur
Schumpeter's  entreprerneur  fits admirably  well into Sen's  scheme  of doings  and beings,  and
illustrates  also the importance  of role selection.  Being  an entrepreneur  requires  abilities  and
character  traits which  Schumpeter  finds important  to describe  in detail, convinced  that readers
might not appreciate  what  sort of a man  is the engine  of development  if he did not describe
him.
The theory is well known.  The engine  is the entrepreneur  who conceives  a "new  combination
of factors of production",  which is possibly  much  more  effective  than the current  one and may
bring him a large profit 83. Innovations  may be small,  the farmer  who discovers  that growing
tomatoes  is profitable  in his village is an entrepreneur.  The funds  required  are usually
borrowed  (if none  are available,  the innovation  remains  a bee in someone's  bonnet).  The profit
eventually  vanishes  as imitation  eliminates  it, returning  the system  to its state as a static
circular  flow.
Neoclassical  theory  has struggled  to model  Schumpeter's  vision  of development.  Grossman
and Helpman's  article (1991),  one of the papers  which Bardhan's  chapter  discusses,  describes
79 Kornai  (1990),  pp 54 and 52.
80 Vogel (1991)  p 43.
81 The Netherlands,  cited above,  received  numerous  migrants  who  fled the Spanish  inquisition,  and at a later  date
French  Huguenots  fleeing  from murderous  persecution.  Partition  has seemingly  not had such  an effect  in the Indian
subcontinent;  in Pakistan  some  descendants  of these  exiles,  a group  that has suffered  from discrimination,  are said
to have  drifted  into the "role"  of gangsterism.
82 Schumpeter  (1934)  p 85.
83 Schumpeter  emphasizes  this repeatedly.
42North-South  competition  in innovation,  but the model  is so hamstrung  by marginal  conditions
and by the constraint  of balanced  growth  that it does not capture  the richness  of Schumpeter's
concept 84. Evenson  and Westphal,  who do not let themselves  be tied down to the Procustean
bed of marginal  analysis,  come  closer.  Other  Schumpeterian  models  exist, of which one is
Cave's  (1983)  model  of the product  cycle.  The work that won Douglas  North  the Nobel  prize is
close to Schumpeter's  thinking,  although  the author does not spell out the connections.
Schumpeter's  model  needs refreshment.  It is not clear whether  the Austrian economist  was
conscious  of the transactional  character  of innovations,  which both North  and Evenson  and
Westphal  emphasize.  Also, he assumes  too readily  that the entrepreneur  earns  the profit  from
his innovation;  more  on this crucial  question  below.
On the first point,  it is fruitful  to relate  Schumpeter's  model  to North's  vision of development,
and in particular  to the latter's  description  of how the large  returns  to scale that characterize
what he calls the "transaction  sector"  of the economy  account  for the cumulative  character  of
development.  The award  of the Nobel  Prize  has popularized  his  views thus I can be brief. In
"The Rise  of the Western  World 85", for example,  North  and the historian  Thomas  argue that the
trigger of development  in successful  European  countries  was at some points  population
growth,  at others  government  decisions  motivated  by the Ruler's  need  for tax income,  which
(often not by design)  favored  growth inducing  activities 86. These  events  created opportunities
which businessmen  took advantage  of, triggering  a virtuous  circle  of innovation  and growth.  A
recent  example  of the this interaction  of sovereign  decisions  and entrepreneurial  activity is of
course Hong  Kong,  which  the accumulation  of trade  information  made so valuable  that at no
point did China  invade  the undefended  Colony 87; another  example  is the ease of interchange  of
ideas  that has fueled  the remarkable  growth  of the Indian  software  industry,  fostered by the
planners'  decision  that the industry  should  be concentrated  around  Bangalore.  In contrast  with
most historians  and many  economists,  North  and Thomas  do not regard  such basic
discoveries  as the invention  of the compass  as prime motors  of development;  these matter
only if economic  conditions  such  as secure  property  rights  and large and growing markets
make  it profitable  to use  those innovations 88.
Schumpeter,  who was  thinking  of developed  countries  in the 1920s,  takes it for granted  that
the entrepreneur's  profit  is not stolen from him. This assumption  is questionable  in many
countries  of the South,  that are so ridden  by regulations  that the public  officials  whom Vogel 89
designates  as "gate keepers",  who stand  between  willing buyers  and sellers, can skim off at no
84 Development, as a catch-up process that slows down radically when Northern technology has been adapted to local
conditions, cannot be described in terms of balanced growth.
85 For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to "the Rise of the Western World" (1973), written with the historian
Thomas, which provides a good overview of North's ideas.
86 For example the English state found it worthwhile to foster foreign trade because its income stemmed from duties on
foreign trade; this gave merchants bargaining power, and fostered legislation that eased their activities and
facilitated growth.
87 Today's "one country two systems" principle expresses the same concern.
88 An opinion that is borne out by China's failure to exploit the remarkable inventions of its people; see Needham
(1954) for an impressive panorama of China's technological creativity.
89 This felicitous term is used by Vogel (1989), e.g. p 410.
43risk a large slice of entrepreneurial  profit 90. The fight against  corruption  is more  than a fight for
equity, its success  is crucial  for development.
Private  operators  engage  in extortion  too. Returning  to Basu's  (1989)  remark  about  the
structure  of rural credit markets,  if the village  lender  is able  to operate  as a discriminating
monopolist,  he can as E3esley  notes  (3:36:2199)  appropriate  all the entrepreneurial  profit.  This
reduces  the incentive  to innovate.
The technology  accumulated  since  the industrial  revolution  is not conveniently  stored on a
shelf, every  implementation  requires  perseverance  to overcome  transactional  obstacles,
money  to pay for start-up  costs,  inventivity  to adapt  the technology  to local possibilities,  and an
ability  to lead men. Planners  may  have provided  the lubricant  that eases the process,
especially  in the early years, but development's  engine is the entrepreneur".
14)  Conclusion
Development  economics,  like all of economics,  has  made remarkable  progress  in fifty years.  There
is greater dominance  than  formerly  by one school  of thought,  but the range of research  has  become
broader.  Economics  has "hardened"  as its proponents  learned  to use data more  carefully  and to
reason  more rigorously  -- much  early post-war  work seems  sloppy  in retrospect.
The policy  message  has been  turned upside  down. Gone  is the idea that development  is
industrialization  and that the main policy  problem  is to manage  the interface  between  country  and
city. It is viewed  today as an integrated  transformation  of which  urbanization  and industrialization
are but two components.  The expansion  of foreign  trade has become  a central issue.  Economic
organization  theory  has taught  us to view traditional  institutions  with far more  understanding  than in
the past: over-hasty  modernization  has often  proved  counter-productive.
More  than ever, development  is seen as a "whole  replacement"  process,  the key to which is
mastery  of Northern  technology.  The latter  is now understood  to be both  simpler  and more  complex
than had been thought.  Simpler  because  much  technology  is uncomplicated,  complex  because
even simple  technology  requires  ingenuity  and a costly investment  in adaptations.
The most important  change  has  however  been  a radical  change  in economists'  view of rnarket
agents and policy  makers.  Gone  are the days  when  they thought  that their advice  should  be aimed
primarily  at planners.  Policy  makers  are utility  maximizers  too; the employees  of state enterprises
coalesce  into powerful  interest  groups  that block  efforts  to raise productivity.  The new thinking  is
sometimes  modified  by evocation  of the rather  vague  concept  of "governance",  according  to which
the economists'  task is to help design  a system  of interacting  state and private  institutions  which. led
by the state,  cooperate  in achieving  social  goals.  Whether  something  useful  will come  out of this line
of thinking  is to be seen.
90 The recent  Bre-X  affair  provided  an unusually  explicit  illustration  of the ability  of "gate  keepers"  to appropriate  a part  of
entrepreneurial  profit.  The country's  President  secured  for himself  a 40 percent  share  of what  was advertized  as the
largest  gold deposit  ever  discovered,  paid nothing  and  thus lost nothing  when  it turned  out that no gold had been
found (Financial  Times,  "All  in the Game  for the Suharto  Clan,"  May  8, 1997,  which  cites  the head  of  the President's
investment  trust).
91 The development  of Korea's  shipbuilding  industry  is an example  of an excellent  decision  of planners.
44Study of the Handbook  has convinced  me that there are major  gaps in our understanding  of
development.  Building  on Sen's formulation  of how development  should  be assessed,  I discussed
two areas for study. One is collective  action,  a far more  pervasive  component  of human  action
than is realized.  The other is the selection  of roles by individuals  and the costly self-investment
that this entails.  This concept may shed light on Schumpeter's  well known but little  studied
entrepreneur.
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